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
RECYCLING THE POOR LAWS:
A HISTORY OF WELFARE, CROSS-SECTIONAL AND LONGITUDINAL
STATISTICAL STUDIES CONCERNING GENERAL RELIEF
POLICIES IN CALIFORNIA


Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Public Administration

by
Carolyn Lea Clark-Daniels
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Second Reader

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Of course, any conclusions drawn in this paper are solely my own and I take full responsibility for them.

TO STEVE

whose help, encouragement and ability to live with me through
this paper is worth more than gold.

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Chapter 1

HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA WELFARE POLICIES

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to present an overview of the history of California welfare policies and to examine county-funded general relief policies across the 58 counties in California and across time.

An extensive search of the literature was conducted through the University of California library system and national reference libraries. A history of California welfare policies after 1935 has not been written. Only one article presents a history of the 1957 California legislature and its welfare reforms.¹ The bibliography reflects the available literature on this subject.

The only available data on all counties' general relief policies was a 1981 state survey conducted by the California Department of Social Services. This survey concerned only maximum benefits available on a county-by-county basis. Because general relief programs are county-

1. tenBroek, Jacobus, "Welfare in the 1957 Legislature," California Law Review 46 (August 1958), pp. 331-375.

funded, very little data is maintained at the state level.² This author became interested in the wide variations of county general relief programs through various discussions with Candy Nobel and Ginger Simpson of the Statistical Services Branch of the California State Department of Social Services during December 1982. It was apparent that no one had conducted an extensive study of general relief programs. For this reason, the survey shown in Appendices A and B was conducted at the beginning of this study (done in December 1982 and January 1983).

Furthermore, it appeared that policies of welfare were cyclical and that certain variables had some influence on general relief policies. These variables are presented in Chapters 2 and 3 as well as development and outcomes of presented hypotheses.

PREMISES OF THE POOR LAWS

Although most of the current debate on welfare dates back to the New Deal in the 1930's, welfare in the United States is not a recent development. The origins of current American welfare policy go back to the colonial era. The English Poor Laws of the sixteenth and seventeenth

2. These programs receive neither state or federal funding. The state only required counties to report statistical data concerning "Home Relief Recipients and Expenditures by Type and Case," "Total General Relief Expenditures by Type," "General Home Relief Total Persons Aided," "Expenditures and Percent Change," and "Miscellaneous General Relief Cases, Persons and Expenditures," on a monthly basis in Public Welfare In California PA-3 until July 1982. After that time (the beginning of a new fiscal year) the reported data was changed. For this reason, this author is concerned with fiscal years in the cross-sectional study.

centuries influenced the colonial leaders who drew heavily upon them when formulating the American approach. Therefore, in order to understand welfare philosophy in the United States, a closer study of the English Poor Laws is necessary.³

Before the Poor Laws were enacted, economic conditions produced a rise in poverty in England. However, many felt it was laziness that caused poverty and that the poor should be punished because they were poor.⁴ Even in the fourteenth century it had been a crime to give alms to "those which may labor." After that time period only those who were "impotent" (disabled) were allowed to beg.⁵ The distinction between the "impotent" and the able-bodied poor became the centerpiece for the Poor Laws and, indeed, for most subsequent welfare legislation.

Local Public Responsibility For The Poor

The Poor Laws' enactment was the first time that local governmental responsibility for the poor was established.⁶ Prior to this, churches and charitable organizations had cared for the poor. The church's poverty jurisdiction was similar to that for marriage and divorce.⁷ Also, beg-

3. deSchweintz, Karl, England's Road to Social Security (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943), p. 59.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. 43 Elizabeth 1, chapter 2, (1601).

7. tenBroek, Jacobus, Family Law and the Poor (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Company, 1971), p. 12.

ging was an established and reputable practice. The government responsibility assumed by the Poor Laws was not intended to eliminate these other sources of aid. They were designed to supplement charitable programs administered by others and to give local government authorities the right to attend to the poor. However, all of these other sources of aid were to be funneled through the local governments.

The Deserving and Non-deserving Poor

Because local governments were now responsible for the poor, they alone decided who should receive aid and who should not. Relief was given without reservation to the "lame, impotent, old and the blind."⁸ These were the deserving poor. The non-deserving poor were those classified as vagrants and the able-bodied unemployed.

The vagrant was put to work and the money from his labors was used to pay the balance of his debt or to support his wife and children.⁹ Vagrants who refused to work could be removed to houses of correction, whipped, branded, stoned, or put to death. Those considered paupers (the able-bodied and unemployed poor) were punished by being placed in workhouses.¹⁰

8. 43 Elizabeth 1, chapter 2, (1601).

9. Ibid.

10. Trattner, Walter I., From Poor Law to Welfare State 2nd ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 8.

OTHER REQUIREMENTS OF THE POOR LAWS

Workhouses

Implicit in the Poor Laws was the condition that the able-bodied but poverty-stricken person must work for the charity he or she received. Parish workhouses were set up to this end. The overseers of the poor were to set to work "all such persons, married or unmarried, having no means to maintain themselves, and use no ordinary and daily trade of life to get their living by." At these workhouses the parishes were to raise.... (by taxation)...a convenient stock of flax, hemp, wool, thread, iron and other necessary ware and stuff, to set the poor to work.¹¹ The belief of the English Parliament was that the poor could be reformed by removing them from the environments which had presumably led them astray.¹²

Residency Requirements

In order to receive aid the pauper had to have established settlement in the community.¹³ Strangers were to be forcibly removed if they were destitute or likely to become so.¹⁴ Economic security was very important then as it is now.¹⁵ This was a time of severe food shortages,

11. 43 Elizabeth 1, chapter 2, (1601).

12. Ibid.

13. 43 Elizabeth 1, chapter 2, (1601).

14. Ibid.

15. deSchweintz, England's Road, p. 62.

widespread famine, and escalating prices.¹⁶ The stranger at the door was perceived to be a threat and there simply was no aid available for him.¹⁷

Responsibility of Relatives

Parents, insofar as their means would allow, were legally liable for the support of their children and grandchildren. Likewise, children were responsible for their needy parents and grandparents. Those who could afford to were charged by local officials to discharge their duty "in that manner and according to the rate fixed."¹⁸

TENETS OF CALIFORNIA WELFARE

The above tenets of the Poor Laws have been passed down from generation to generation. Though most of these laws (e.g., the death penalty for vagrancy) have been modified over time, this type of welfare law exists in California today.¹⁹ General relief policies across all counties have many of the same characteristics. However, welfare policy under Spain before statehood was considerably different.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. 43 Elizabeth 1, chapter 2, (1601).

19. tenBroek, Jacobus, "California's Welfare Law - Origins and Development," California Law Review 45 (July 1957), p. 270. See also California Welfare Handbook of 1982 published by the California State Department of Social Services.

SPANISH WELFARE POLICY²⁰

In the early days, the Spanish priests established missions for the care and instruction of Indians living in California. California was an outpost on the periphery of the Spanish empire. Theoretically, it was under the absolute power of Spain. In actuality, California was left to its own devices and a system of welfare evolved through the missions.

A thin line of missions (21) stretched up the coast of California. This system of missions maintained maximum control over the Indians, providing work for them and "civilizing" them. The missions were thus an integral part of Spanish policy. They were not only religious but military, political, economic, and social centers.

The Spanish colonial policy held that the Indian should be integrated into their society. The objective of this was consistent with the Catholic conception of the Indian as one who, though barbarous, unconverted, and degraded, was yet a person with an immortal soul to be saved. Once recognized as such, the Indian was therefore accepted. Another reason for Spanish acceptance was the lack of sufficient number of Spaniards to settle California. In lieu of Spaniards, the Indians would have to do.

20. Information presented in this section is based on the research of Jacobus tenBroek in his article "California Welfare Law - Origins and Development," California Law Review (July 1957), pp. 241-303.

The mission was intended to be a temporary answer to colonization of the land. When the taming of the Indians was completed, the priests were to move on to other frontiers. The missions were to become pueblos and the land divided among the Indians, thus guaranteeing their welfare.

Despite the apparent concern for the Indians' souls, this system of welfare was very punitive. The Indians were captured and forced to learn hygiene and civilized ways. They were not allowed to leave the missions and if they escaped they were severely punished when they were recaptured.

The laws of Mexico (and Spain) continued to influence California until 1822, long after the secularization of the missions and the beginning of the influx of settlers from the United States. Although, the welfare system based on communal labor died with the missions in the 1830's, there were many general provisions dealing with welfare subjects. Often, Spanish (and frequently, pueblo) law gave its blessing and financial support to charitable establishments of both public and private origin. These institutions dealt with the problems of dependent and delinquent children, of the sick, and of vagrancy. However, the problems of the aged, disabled or simply poverty-stricken received less attention.

Overall, Mexican (and Spanish) policy showed no consistent pattern. This changed with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1846. The treaty ceded the territory of California to the United States. Welfare policy began to change significantly with statehood in 1849.

1849 THROUGH 1929

The arrival of settlers from the United States profoundly altered

the demographics of California. From gold-rush days to the present the dominant part of the population has consisted of white Europeans. Therefore, Anglo-American tradition of welfare policy soon replaced the policies of Spain.²¹ The welfare provisions now existing in the state come from the Poor Laws. The restrictiveness of these laws passed to the state of California. The principles of local governmental responsibility, conditions of eligibility, relief for the poor who were unable to work and reimbursement by a wealthier relation were all adopted.²² As in the Poor Laws, these restrictions generally excluded the able-bodied poor.²³

The state constitution of 1849 and its revision in 1879 both allowed for the care of the indigent sick but not of the employable poor.²⁴ In 1852 county boards of supervisors were given the right by the state to care for various needy persons as they saw fit. In general, the boards relied on the state's restrictive classifications. For example, in Placer county poor persons were separated into socially respectable and unrespectable, and those who were indigent before or after illness.²⁵ San Mateo

21. In 1850 "More than twenty-nine thirtieths of the immigrants in the state came from that part of the union where the common law (English) was recognized." These men were therefore acquainted with common law. The majority of California judges knew very little about civil law or the law of Spain but practiced the common law of England. Jack Goodwin, The Establishment of State Government In California (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1914), pp. 285-286.

22. California Welfare Handbook, Op. Cit.

23. Ibid.

24. Cal. Stat. 1852, c. XXXVII, p. 87, s. 7.

25. Placer County, 1852, c. CCXI, p. 243.

county in 1866 was unique in its policy toward indigents. They provided for the care of all the indigent - not only the sick.²⁶ In the rest of the state during the 1850's, however, welfare for the indigent was at low levels. Labor was in constant demand in California. But with the completion of the Central Pacific Railway in 1869, the demand for laborers decreased. Industry and agriculture were unable to absorb all those who were unemployed and the need for welfare grew.²⁷

Thus, beginning in 1870, the problem of caring for the unemployed became a serious problem for local communities. Various benevolent societies began in cities and towns from Grass Valley to San Diego. These societies aided the unemployed until the adoption of the 1879 constitution prohibited such societies.²⁸ These societies were considered secret societies and against the new constitution.²⁹

During the 1880's many of the unemployed came to San Francisco to seek work. The city was overwhelmed with requests for aid and churches fed more than 2,000 men daily during the most severe period of unemployment. Even so, there was considerable discrimination at this time and only whites were aided. In fact, many measures were passed which speci-

26. San Mateo County, 1866, c. CCVI, p. 339, s. 15.

27. Cahn, Frances and Valeska Barry, Welfare Activities of Federal, State and Local Governments in California 1850-1934, (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1936), p. 198.

28. Constitution of California, 1879, Art. IV, Sec. 22.

29. Cahn, Welfare Activities, p. 199.

fically excluded the immigrant Chinese and the native Indian.³⁰

Employment returned to a higher level during the late 1880's, but in 1893 a financial panic brought about another depression. The result was mass unemployment and a demand for welfare services for the unemployed. Again, the city of San Francisco provided relief for many by contributing \$3,000 per month to various charities and churches who aided the able-bodied poor.³¹ Even the police gave free meals and lodging (in the jails) to all who applied.³²

Many were so desperate that they joined roving bands who sought work in towns across the state.³³ In 1894, these bands of men joined with those in other states.³⁴ They marched to Washington, D.C., demanding federal aid.³⁵ Congress did consider the federal welfare issue but in the end no aid was made available. This was considered a local issue and not a federal concern.³⁶

30. Coolridge, Mary Roberts, Chinese Immigration, (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1909), p. 37.

31. Cahn, Welfare Activities 1850 - 1934, p. 203.

32. Ibid.

33. McMurray, Donald L., Cozey's Army, (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1929), p. 127.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

The persistent problems of poverty and unemployment increased the pressure toward centralized welfare policy. Finally, in 1903, the State Board of Charities and Corrections was initiated.³⁷ This Board assumed responsibility for all welfare except county general relief. Despite the centralization, the structure of welfare policy changed little. Categorization of aid was continued by the Board. The indigent sick, the aged, the blind, and the orphaned children were aided but the able-bodied poor person was still excluded. There were reorganizations of the Board in 1927 and 1928 as the Board became the Department of Social Welfare. Still, no plans or provisions were made for the able-bodied unemployed.³⁸

THE 1930'S

During the 1930's welfare philosophy changed. In particular, the Great Depression had a lasting effect on welfare policy. First, after 1933 the federal government took an active role in relief for the first time.³⁹ Second, because of the large number of people who were destitute it was perceived by policymakers that poverty was not necessarily the fault of the poor. As a result, some type of relief was made available to all who were able to prove that they were in need. Even so, cate-

37. Leiby, James, "State Welfare Administration in California, 1879 - 1929," California Historical Review 41 (May 1972), p. 175.

38. "California Conference of Social Work," Bulletin (Aug. 1928), pp. 19-20.

39. Pierson, Harry E., "The Changing Relief Picture," Tax Digest 19 (December 1941), p. 406.

gorization and other forms of restriction persisted as the welfare rolls expanded. The resulting conflict in welfare philosophy between the New Deal philosophy of giving aid to everyone and the Poor Law philosophy blaming the poor for their problems profoundly affected welfare policies during the 1930's.⁴⁰

The aid ultimately given to the able-bodied poor was a unique hybrid of these philosophies. Aid was given to all who applied, but it was invariably in the form of work, not cash. And, there were other restrictions as well. The result was the establishment of various work programs such as the federal Works Progress Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps, and the creation of the work camps by the state of California.⁴¹ These camps provided a less expensive solution to a potentially explosive problem. California had the largest population of homeless in the United States.⁴² This was due in large part to the migration by many from the dust bowl region of the midwest. Many of these migrants, married or unmarried, went to the work camps where they were sheltered and fed in return for the work they performed. Other welfare programs restricted aid to those who had resided in California for three years prior to their request for aid, but the work camps were available to all.⁴³

40. Ibid.

41. Wood, Sammuel F., "Work Camps Or Nothing," Survey 75 (April, 1939), p. 99.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

Much of the federal legislation was more inclusive and expansionary. Because there were so many able-bodied people who were out of work and destitute in the United States, the Social Security laws of 1935 were enacted.⁴⁴ During the Great Depression there was no help for the workers who had lost their savings due to bank failures nor any method of aiding the future retirement of these workers. Social Security and its amendments to aid the disabled worker and widows of workers as well as their children provided such aid and greatly reduced welfare rolls. The first benefits from federal Social Security were paid in California in 1936. In conjunction California passed the Old Age Security Act which supplemented federal benefits.⁴⁵

Thus, welfare policy during the 1930's was both restrictive at the state level and expansionary at the federal level. These contradictory impulses persisted into the 1940's. Fluctuations in economic stability and changes in political administration effectively created cycles in welfare policy. For example, as recovery from the Great Depression began, in the late 1930's and early 1940's, all forms of welfare once again became more restrictive.

44. Social Security Act of Aug. 14, 1935, for a complete discussion see Altmeyer, Arthur J., The Formative Years of Social Security (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1968).

45. California Stats. 1936 Ex. Sess., Ch. 7, p. 11.

1940'S TO 1960

World War II brought about full employment as the economy gained strength. By 1943, the work camps had disappeared. There were fewer people in need and the problems of the poor became much less visible. The federal government assumed no further financial responsibility for meeting needs due to unemployment through public assistance programs after the work camps shut down.⁴⁶

The postwar boom continued until 1949 and unemployment remained at a low level. But, recessions in 1949, 1953/54 and 1957/58 increased unemployment and reawakened images of the previous decade.

In response to economic pressures the 1957 legislature passed 70 measures affecting welfare. This was 50 percent more than had passed during the 10 preceding years. New programs of public medical care and aid to the permanently disabled were instituted. Programs for the blind and dependent children were significantly improved.⁴⁷ Of note also is what the 1957 legislature failed to do. The two parent household remained on general relief funded solely by the counties of California.

Also, during this period, strong national pressures were brought to provide unemployment insurance of some duration. Instead, on May 1961 the federal government included the unemployed single parent family under

46. tenBroek, Jacobus, "Welfare in the 1957 Legislature," California Law Review 46 (August 1958), p. 330.

47. Ibid, p. 331.

Aid to Dependent Children (ADC).⁴⁸ However, if there were two parents in the household only general assistance was available for the family.⁴⁹ The standards for families with two parents set by general relief were far below the benefits available for one parent households through ADC.

THE 1960'S - WAR ON POVERTY

In the beginning of the 1960's, welfare practices continued in much the same manner. Counties continued to care for those who did not qualify for any other type of aid.⁵⁰ However, in 1962 there were some changes in the makeup of ADC welfare cases. Two parent households were now accepted (AFDC-U) and thus were removed from the county general relief programs. Categorization between one parent households (now AFDC) and AFDC-U cases continues today.⁵¹ This is important because the change relieved county welfare burdens.

In 1964, California instituted a "no work, no dole" plan. This plan was intended to trim ever-increasing welfare rolls of both counties and the state welfare programs.⁵² Unfortunately, the plan did not cut the rolls.

48. PL. 87 - 31, Title IV, May 8, 1961.

49. Simmons, Harold E., Work Relief to Rehabilitation, (Sacramento, California: The Citadel Press, 1969), p. 135.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Smith, David C., "California 'No Work, No Dole' Plan Seeks To Trim Welfare Rolls and Fill Farm Jobs," Wall Street Journal 164 (October 6, 1964), p. 6.

In 1963 Lyndon B. Johnson became president of the United States. He subsequently declared war on poverty. California accepted President Johnson's programs to combat poverty early in 1965. Under California Title V programs the state opened day care centers in order to enable the able-bodied poor to go to work. Work experience and training centers and centers for the care of the poor were also established.⁵³ In Los Angeles county, federally funded housing repair was undertaken and retraining programs instituted.⁵⁴ The Title V programs also concentrated on improving the education of the hard-core poor.⁵⁵

Though no comprehensive evaluation of the Title V programs was ever undertaken, overall, the combination of social welfare and training did improve the plight of many of the poor through 1970.

The impact of the Title V programs on the basic structure of general relief was profound. During the early 1960's welfare recipients on general relief in California had risen to 86,000.⁵⁶ With the state acceptance of the Great Society programs in 1965, the general relief rolls fell to 36,000 as many recipients were absorbed into various federal programs. As the Great Society programs became more restrictive, gen-

53. Simmons, Work Relief, p. 193.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. California, Health and Welfare Agency, Department of Social Services, Statistical Services Branch, Public Welfare in California, PA3.

eral relief rolls again climbed. By 1970 there were 74,000 persons on general relief.⁵⁷

Though the number of people fell and rose again the most dramatic rise was in grant per recipient. In 1961 an average grant was \$296.98 per year.⁵⁸ The 1965 grant recipients received \$401.68 average grant per recipient per year.⁵⁹ Although the number of recipients had fallen the amount per recipient had risen dramatically as money was shared by fewer people. In 1970, the average grant per recipient was \$461.88 per year. The welfare rolls had again swelled but the grant did not decrease accordingly.⁶⁰ As a result, the total cost of general relief grew from \$25.6 million in 1961 to \$34.1 million in 1970.⁶¹

THE 1970'S

By 1970 California found that welfare costs had risen to a crisis level. Approximately 2.3 million Californians were receiving welfare benefits of all kinds, an almost fourfold increase in ten years. In 1970 alone, the welfare caseload had increased by 20 percent. About 40,000

57. Ibid, 1970.

58. All dollar amounts are shown in 1967 dollars. Public Welfare, 1961.

59. Public Welfare, 1965.

60. Ibid, 1970.

61. Ibid, 1961 and 1970.

additional recipients were being added monthly.⁶² The increasing costs were going to have to be met by large increases in state and local taxes or by the discontinuance of other needed public projects.⁶³

Control of welfare restrictions had grown lax in the late 1960's when many expected President Nixon's Family Assistance Plan, which guaranteed a minimum income, to be passed by Congress. Because of this, a sense of relief resulted in the abandonment of any reform efforts. It was thought that the federal government would soon take over all welfare programs.⁶⁴

In 1971, California found that the federal government did not take over the welfare programs and that welfare costs continued to increase. The state officials under the guidance of then-Governor Ronald Reagan instituted welfare reforms. They set out to trim from the welfare rolls those who had no business receiving welfare payments (according to state criteria for recipients) and to prevent new applicants from joining the welfare rolls if they were ineligible.⁶⁵ A program to educate those who were eligible for welfare but not aware of it was begun.⁶⁶

62. Anderson, Martin, Welfare (Stanford, California: Hoover Institute Press, 1978), p. 154.

63. "Ways to Get Welfare In Hand: Success For Two Big States," U.S. News and World Report 75 (December 24, 1974), p. 66.

64. "Governor Reagan's Welfare Reform: Plans, Problems and Prospects," California Journal 2 (March, 1971), p. 63.

65. Anderson, Welfare, p. 155.

66. Ibid.

There was a move to make existing welfare laws more restrictive and at the same time to carefully enforce existing laws. According to Martin Anderson, Welfare the results were dramatic:

"By June 1973 there were 352,000 fewer people receiving public welfare in California than there were in March 1971. About 785,000 fewer people were on the welfare rolls than had been projected on the assumptions of no reforms."⁶⁷

The interpretation of these results is subject to some controversy. According to Harold Simmons, the Reagan reforms produced a more cost-oriented welfare philosophy.⁶⁸ On the other hand, Barbara Joe recalls that the state was experiencing a decline in the state rate of growth and that increased demand for employment actually was the cause of the welfare rolls declining.⁶⁹

Another work program was instituted by the 1971 reform law. This work program required all able-bodied persons on any type of state or federal welfare to work 20 hours per week. Most counties instituted work programs for general relief recipients as well. This work program was very successful as many people were trained and subsequently employed, thus reducing the welfare rolls.⁷⁰

67. Ibid, p. 156.

68. Simmons, Harold E., Recycling the 1601 Elizabethan Poor Law (Sacramento, California: General Welfare Publications, 1975), p. 87.

69. Joe, Barbara F., "Reagan's Welfare Fraud," Washington Monthly 28 (October 1980), p. 34.

70. Lubin, Joann S., "California Puts People On Welfare To Work In A Controversial Test," Wall Street Journal 180 (October 20, 1972), p. 1.

Despite the general restrictiveness of the 1971 reforms, the Poor Law philosophy contained in general relief policy did change to some degree during this period. Residency requirements in most counties were reduced to proof of intent to stay in the county. This could be substantiated by a current rent receipt. The few counties that did not adopt this policy reduced residency requirements to one year.⁷¹

Another restriction that was dropped from general relief was the relatives' responsibility clause. No longer were wealthier relatives held responsible for general relief costs.⁷² However, these two changes were small considering other general relief policies discussed below.

Overall, welfare costs were stabilized until 1978 and caseloads decreased.⁷³ But, with the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, property tax reform meant fewer funds for welfare programs. This was a period of intense readjustment for California at all levels of government. It should be noted that welfare policy became even more restrictive because of the lack of available funds.⁷⁴

71. California Welfare and Institutions Code.

72. Ibid.

73. "Whither Human Services?" Western City (March 1979), p. 4.

74. Ibid.

THE 1980'S

Welfare policy has continued to be restrictive. An important continuing factor in qualifying for welfare is the requirement of a permanent street address. However, in the 80's many sleep in the street or in tents.⁷⁵ This is a period of high unemployment and the permanent address requirement can't be met by those who can't afford rent.

In addition, due to the cut-off of funds for AFDC-U families by the state and federal governments in January 1983, (because of scarcity of federal funding) many have been forced back onto the general relief rolls. Many have also joined the ranks of the unemployed and homeless. In some parts of California churches have opened their doors at night in order that these people have a place to sleep.⁷⁶

With the inauguration of Governor George Deukmejian in January 1983, once again there is a call for welfare reform.⁷⁷ To date Deukmejian's principal policy seems to be "work for welfare." This policy has been instituted before and the objective is to reduce welfare costs.⁷⁸

Currently, 2.2 million Californians receive welfare benefits of all kinds. The federal government pays \$3.2 billion of this cost, the state

75. Raposa, Ron, "Tattered Tent Is Home For Jobless Family," The Press Enterprise 105 (February 28, 1983), p. B-3.

76. "Homeless Get a Place to Sleep Atop Nob Hill," The New York Times 132 (January 18, 1983), p. 7.

77. Weller, Don "Deukmejian To Seek Big Welfare Change," The Press Enterprise 105 (February 26, 1983), p. 1.

78. Ibid.

about \$2.75 billion, and the counties \$330 million, mostly for general relief.⁷⁹ Like the federal government, the state wants to return more welfare programs to the local levels of government. Thus, welfare policy in the 1980's seems increasingly likely to resemble the Elizabethan poor laws of the 1600's.

CYCLES OF WELFARE ACTIVITY

Until the Great Depression welfare philosophy and policies in the United States and California were generally restrictive. A new philosophy of welfare for all was born of the overwhelming need caused by the Depression.⁸⁰ The alteration between these philosophies begun during the Great Depression continues to this day.

As World War II created full-employment, welfare policy again became restrictive. But when the war ended in 1945 there was a loosening of welfare policy to meet employment reductions in the post-war economy.⁸¹

From 1950 to 1957 welfare rolls generally, and county general relief rolls specifically, stabilized and more social programs were added by

79. Ibid, (all dollars in 1983 amounts).

80. See Piven, Frances Fox and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor (New York: Random House, 1971) and The New Class War (New York: Random House, 1982) for discussion of the national welfare policies and how they are used to control the poor.

81. Ibid.

the 1957 legislature to aid those who had not been helped by state programs before.⁸²

The state continued in an expansionary mode through the Great Society programs of the 1960's. However, by 1971 California was met by ever increasing welfare costs and another reform again restricted welfare.

The restrictiveness of the 1971 reform was magnified by the 1978 passage of Proposition 13 which again cut state and local revenues. Faced with budget shortfalls in the 1983/84 fiscal year the state welfare policy has become even more restrictive in scope. The counties are especially short of revenue and their policies for general relief remain very restrictive.⁸³

GENERAL RELIEF IN CALIFORNIA

In August of 1935 the fiftieth session of the legislature reaffirmed the laws governing the indigent in California. General relief from that day forward was to continue as a county affair to be administered by county welfare department in conjunction with county boards of supervisors. These programs were to be funded solely by the counties.⁸⁴

82. See Jacobus tenBroek, "The 1957 Legislature."

83. Counties show evidence of these shortages through their freezes on hiring and cutbacks in county services.

84. Bornet, Vaughn Davis, California Social Welfare (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956), p. 82.

General relief is available to any poor person who does not qualify for other categories of state and federal aid. These programs can be considered programs of last resort.⁸⁵

Even so, most counties in California have some standards that must be met before general relief is given to a recipient. Some of the principles of the Poor Laws are embodied in these programs. Based on requirements, even at this level there are deserving and non-deserving poor.

Some of the restrictions placed on general relief applicants include the necessity of a permanent street address, limits on the amount of cash, personal property, and equity in an auto or home that an applicant can have.⁸⁶ This was substantiated by the survey this author conducted of all 58 counties in California.

Under California law, counties can establish almshouses and county farms.⁸⁷ State law also permits counties to take action which would benefit the indigent sick.⁸⁸ Counties can also bury the indigent dead; this is commonly done.⁸⁹ Non-residents of a county are to be given emergency aid only.⁹⁰

85. Ibid.

86. See Appendix B.

87. California Welfare and Institutions Code, Section 2400. A farm may be established, Section 205.

88. Section 200.

89. Section 207.

90. Section 2501.

Counties may also require that the able-bodied work for the general relief they receive.⁹¹

That the counties may do these various things does not keep them from doing others or from not doing all of the items stated above. The area of county general relief programs is as varied as the 58 counties in California. State mandate requires that the counties maintain a program for the aid of indigents, but the implementations of these programs are myriad.⁹²

For example, Sacramento county has recently instituted the use of a poorhouse. Currently, no cash assistance or food stamps are given to those who apply for and accept general relief.⁹³ Instead, since October 1982, people are sent to the Bannon Street house which is run solely for county general relief recipients. There they are fed and given a place to sleep. They are required to work 3 days per week for this welfare program. The effect of this program has been to cut the welfare rolls and welfare costs dramatically. Sacramento county's welfare program costs have dropped from \$6.7 million per year to \$118,000 per year.⁹⁴ Actually,

91. Section 2505.

92. See Appendices A and B.

93. Taylor, Ronald B., "Needy Denied Cash Aid, Sent to Poorhouse Instead," Los Angeles Times 102 (February 21, 1983), p. 1.

94. Ibid.

general relief applicants are refusing this type of aid in Sacramento county; instead, they are sleeping on the streets.⁹⁵

Other counties are observing the Sacramento experiment and a return of poorhouses may be seen under the general relief programs. This would again further restrict general relief policies.

95. Ibid.

Chapter 2

CROSS-SECTIONAL STUDY OF GENERAL RELIEF

Introduction

In the previous chapter the cyclical nature of welfare policy was noted. In particular, the evidence suggested that welfare policy at all levels was profoundly influenced by changes in such external factors as the state of the economy and the political environment. The welfare system responded to these changes by manipulating the only policy variables which were sensitive to direct action by welfare administrators. These variables were the eligibility requirements, grant per recipient, and work restrictions necessary for admission to the programs. In other words, the welfare system responds to economic and political changes in its policy environment by manipulating just those factors which link current welfare policy to the Elizabethan Poor Laws. The use of eligibility classification as a tool to manage the growth of the system is as prevalent now as it was in the 1600's.

General relief policy is especially sensitive to the influences discussed above. As noted in the previous chapter, general relief represents the last link in the safety net before the recipient drops entirely out of the system. This means that recipients who receive general relief are generally not eligible for federal- and state-funded relief. As eligibility requirements are manipulated at the federal and state level, the county general relief rolls will fluctuate. As a result, county-funded general relief policies will reflect not only national

political and economic trends, but state-level and county-level forces as well.

The purpose of the next two chapters is to analyze the forces which influence county commitment to general relief programs. Two different approaches to this problem are possible. The first approach is to explain differences across counties in California. This approach is important because different counties face different combinations of economic development, revenue sources, and political context in attempting to establish viable general relief policies. The second approach is to aggregate county-level general relief data to the state level and look for state-level factors which influence the aggregate county decisions across time.

The latter approach will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. In this Chapter the concentration will be on explaining cross-county differences.

The available policy literature suggests that policy decision-making operates within three sets of constraints.⁹⁶ These three sets of constraints are structural factors, political factors, and policy factors. The most important structural factors are size (population) of the county, economic conditions of the county (e.g., unemployment rate), and

96. Hawkins, Brett W., Politics and Urban Policies (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1971), pp. 3-18. See also Thomas R. Dye, "A Model for the Analysis of Policy Outcomes," Policy Analysis in Political Science, Ira Sharkansky, ed. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 21-38.

financial condition of the county (e.g., county government revenue from all sources).⁹⁷ The major political constraint is the political complexion of the county (e.g., the Democratic or Republican makeup of the electorate).⁹⁸ Size of the county is important because population is a composite of the influences of such variables as population density, urbanization, degree of industrialization, and level of economic development.⁹⁹ In short, size represents the economies of scale associated with large population. These economies of scale will have a direct impact on a county's general relief policies. Urban counties and those with higher levels of development will have more diversified sources of revenue and are also more likely to have those classes of individuals who have a greater probability of being eligible for general relief. Therefore, these counties are more likely to have more liberal general relief policies

97. Dye, "A Model for the Analysis of Policy Outcomes."

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid.

and a greater proportion of recipients.¹⁰⁰

Economic conditions are relevant because the economy of each California county will have a direct bearing on the potential pool of people eligible for general relief.¹⁰¹ The differences across counties in the size of this pool may well have a direct bearing on the restrictiveness of each county's policies and the total proportion of the county population on general relief.

Financial conditions are significant because the size of the available funding will directly influence the restrictiveness of general relief policy.¹⁰² Finally, political complexion is important because the

100. For studies of the impact of urbanization and population on welfare payments and number of recipients, see Hawkins, Politics and Urban Policies, p. 70; Dye, Thomas R., Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1966), pp. 115-148; Dawson, Richard E. and James A. Robinson, "The Politics of Welfare," in Politics In The American States, Herbert Jacobs and Kenneth N. Vines, eds. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), pp. 371-410; Sharkansky, Ira and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," American Political Science Review 63 (September, 1969), pp. 867-879. Of course, not all heavily populated counties will have liberal relief policies. Such reputedly conservative counties as San Bernardino County and Orange County may well have general relief policies more restrictive than expected for their population. However, the regression techniques which will be described in more detail below calculate the degree to which a linear relationship is the best model to describe the relationship between population and policy restrictiveness. A highly positive correlation between these variables would support the hypothesis even though some counties may be more restrictive than predicted.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.

Democratic party and Democratic voters are generally perceived to be more sympathetic to those on welfare.¹⁰³

The policy factors include all policy decisions which are directly under the control of county welfare administrators. For general relief policies these decisions tend to focus on eligibility restrictions. Specifically, county decision-makers can require recipients to work in a county work program, can restrict the amount of cash and personal property the recipient may have and still be eligible, can restrict the eligibility of recipients with equity in an automobile or home and can manipulate the size of an individual's maximum grant.¹⁰⁴ All of these policy restrictions will have a dampening affect on outputs from the general relief system.

The interrelationships among the structural factors can be examined using a variety of statistical methods. It is possible to develop these interrelationships in the form of a series of causal hypotheses.¹⁰⁵ In general, the structural factors should influence the political factors. The structural and political factors should have some causal impact on the policy factors. Finally, all three of these factors should have direct impact on general relief policy outcomes such as county caseload

103. For example, see, McClosky, Herbert, Paul J. Huffman and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," American Political Science Review 54 (1960), pp. 406-472.

104. See work requirements, eligibility restrictions and grant ceilings for all 58 counties in California in APPENDIX B.

105. For a more detailed explication of these interrelations, see the discussion in the sections on the theoretical model and the causal model of structural, political, and policy factors in this chapter.

and average amount of the grant.¹⁰⁶

The data for this analysis are drawn from the period 1974 through 1982.¹⁰⁷ However, data on the policy factors are only available in 1981 and 1982. The 1981 data which focuses solely on the size of the maximum grant per county is drawn from a study by the California Department of Social Services.¹⁰⁸ The 1982 data is drawn from a personal survey by the author of all 58 county Department of Social Services in California.¹⁰⁹ Records of general relief eligibility requirements and work programs are not documented at the state level. The 1981 study represents the first such endeavor of centralized collection of information.

Given the lack of information on policy factors prior to 1981, only the impact of the structural and political factors on general relief caseload and average grant can be assessed for the entire period of 1974 through 1982. Despite this limitation, an analysis of the changes in the relative influence of each of the variables can provide valuable information about the impact of variations in the structural and political environment. This analysis will be performed using multiple regression. The multiple regression technique allows a separate estimate of the in-

106. The expected directions of these interrelationships are described in more detail in the following sections of this chapter.

107. See footnote 121 below.

108. Study provided to the author by Raymond Patrick, Staff Development Supervisor, County of Sonoma, Social Services Department.

109. See APPENDIX A and B.

fluence of each variable controlling for the effects of all the other variables in the equation.¹¹⁰

The availability of data on the policy factors allows for a more sophisticated analysis of the 1982 data. Using the technique of path analysis, it is possible to analyze the direct and indirect impact of all the variables in a causal diagram. Multiple regression only assesses the direct effect of each causal variable on the variable under study. It does not allow the researcher to assess the interrelationships among the causal factors. Path analysis provides a mechanism for analyzing such interrelationships.¹¹¹

The previous discussion is developed in more detail in the rest of this chapter. The next section presents in discursive form the predicted relationships among the structural factors (population of county, economic condition of county, and financial condition of county), political factors (the Democratic or Republican influence in the county), policy factors (the overall restrictiveness of general relief eligibility requirements), and the predicted policy outcomes (general relief caseload per county and average grant per county). These predictions are drawn from the avail-

110. For a more detailed discussion of the multiple regression technique, see Nie, Norman H., C. Hadlai Hull, Jean G. Jenkins, Karin Steinbrenner, and Dale H. Bent, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975), pp. 320-367. The computer programs used throughout this study are SPSS programs.

111. For a more detailed discussion of path analysis, see Asher, Herbert B., Causal Modeling, Sage University Paper series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 07-003 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1976).

able literature on the impact of structural, political, and policy variables on policy outcomes.¹¹² These predictions are presented as a series of hypotheses and are summarized in Figure 1.

The section on the impact of structural and political variables presents the results of the multiple regressions of general relief caseload and average grant per county on county population, county unemployment rate, county revenue per capita and county Democratic voting deviation for 1974 to 1982. The section concludes with a discussion of the implications of the findings.

The section on the causal model of structural, political, and policy factors operationalizes the causal model presented in Figure 1. Some of the predictions are changed to conform with the indicators used. The revised causal model is presented in Figure 2. Separate path analyses for general relief caseload and average grant are presented in Figures 3 and 4. The accuracy of the original model is then examined. The section concludes with a discussion of the implications of the path analysis models.

The chapter ends with a summary of the statistical models and an examination of their consequences.

112. See footnotes 113 through 123 in the next section for the available literature.

THEORETICAL MODEL

Structural and Political Factors

A search of the available literature suggests a number of possible effects of structural and political factors on each other and on more explicitly policy-oriented variables. The structural conditions of a county ultimately influence both the restrictiveness of general relief policies and the outcomes of those policies, such as caseload and expenditures per case. Of these conditions, the most important is the size of the county. Size is a composite of many factors such as population, population density, urbanization, degree of industrialization, and level of economic development. In short, size represents a whole host of economies of scale associated with the differing economies and social structures of the various counties.¹¹³

In general, the more populated the county, the more complex its economic structure and therefore, the less likely it will be affected by a poor nationwide economy. Conversely, smaller counties with simpler economic structures (i.e. based on a single industry such as the lumber industry) are likely to be more sensitive to changes in the national economy.¹¹⁴

113. Hofferbert, Richard I., "Socioeconomic Dimensions of the American States: 1890-1960," Midwest Journal of Political Science 12 (August 1968), pp. 401-418; Sharkansky and Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics and Public Policy."

114. Dye, "Politics, Economics, and the Public," pp. 7-10.

The population of the county can also directly affect financial conditions in county governments. Larger counties should have a more diverse source of funds and a larger property tax base. By contrast, smaller counties may be expected to have many fewer sources of income.¹¹⁵

Size can influence the political context of a county. Larger counties, because of their greater complexity, industrialization, and urbanization, are likely to have more blue-collar workers, more lower income families and greater ethnic diversity. These groups tend to be Democratic and liberal in political orientation. Rural counties are inclined to be more homogeneous, less industrialized, and, therefore, more Republican and conservative.¹¹⁶

Population will also directly and indirectly affect the general relief policies in the counties. The indirect effects of population will be transmitted through economic conditions, financial conditions, and the political context. The direct effects of population on relief policy will manifest themselves in several ways. First, counties with larger minority and low-income populations tend to have less restrictive general relief policies. Second, in larger counties a greater proportion of the population are in need of general relief and there are greater

115. Hofferbert, "Socioeconomic Dimensions;" Hawkins, "Politics and Urban Policies," pp. 113-120.

116. Bone, Hugh A. and Austin Ranney, Politics and Voters, 2nd ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 49-52; See also Nie, Norman H., Sidney Verba, John R. Petrocik, The Changing American Voter, enlarged edition, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979).

caseloads. Third, total expenditures per case are usually higher in counties that have more of the composite factors of size. This is likely to be so because the bigger welfare organizations required in larger counties generate their own policy momentum and generally increase benefits as a result.¹¹⁷

Economic factors, such as the rate of inflation, the unemployment rate, factory utilization, and interest rates reflect the general economic well-being of the county. This general economic climate can cause variation in general relief policy. However, this impact may be contradictory in some counties. Less restrictive policies are likely to lead to increased caseloads and expenditures. By contrast, economic differences directly influence the size of the caseload and expenditures per case for general relief. It is possible that counties with better economies have fewer cases and lower expenditures.¹¹⁸

At the same time, the revenue and expenditures of county governments can make changes in general relief within the county. These financial conditions are influenced and interrelated with population and economic differences. If the economy is healthy, it is likely that more tax revenues will be received by the county. Given this situation, it is

117. Dye, "Politics, Economics, and the Public," pp. 115-148; Tompkins, Gary L., "A Causal Model of State Welfare Expenditures," Journal of Politics 37 (May 1975), pp. 392-416; Dawson and Robinson, "The Politics of Welfare."

118. Ibid.

highly probable that financial conditions within county government would be very good and general relief policies could tend to be quite liberal. Under liberal financial conditions it is possible that general relief caseload and expenditures per case would expand.¹¹⁹

Another factor which influences general relief policy is the political context of the county. Policy will vary depending on the conservativeness or liberalness of county government. If a county constituency has elected a strong Republican government, county policies will likely be very conservative. At the opposite end of the scale, if a strong Democratic county government is elected, general relief policies could be potentially very liberal. The political makeup of the county is related to the size of the county and the economic and financial conditions. By the same measure, caseload and probable expenditures per case for general relief may change depending on the political makeup of county government. Liberal policies may result in larger caseloads and payments, while conservative policies should result in the opposite.¹²⁰

Policy Factors

Besides structural factors, there are also policy factors which influence general relief programs. These policy factors directly relate to the overall restrictiveness of the general relief policies.

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid.

There are three categories of restrictiveness which affect general relief policies. They are:

- 1.) The monthly amount of the grant given to a general relief recipient.
- 2.) The economic restrictions placed on eligibility for the grant, such as upper limits on cash, personal property, automobiles and a home the recipient may possess and still remain eligible for general relief.
- 3.) The requirement that the recipient must work off the amount - usually on a county work project.¹²¹

These policy factors will affect the caseload as fewer people will receive aid because they do not meet eligibility standards, they are unwilling to work for the money received or the size of the grant is considered too small to live on. In all these cases restrictive policies cause caseload to stay the same or to decrease.¹²²

Grant per person, economic restrictions, and employment restrictiveness can have a positive effect on expenditures per case. If caseload is affected negatively through policy factors, it is possible that there will be more dollars to be given to fewer people and, thus more dollars per person.¹²³

121. See APPENDIX A and B

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid.

A Causal Model of County Relief Policy

The discussion above can be summarized by the model in Figure 1.


This figure suggests the following hypotheses.

1. Counties with higher populations are likely to have:
 - a. better economies (+)
 - b. more revenue (+)
 - c. a more Democratic political culture (+)
 - d. less restrictive (more liberal) eligibility and grant requirements (-)
 - e. a larger general relief caseload (+)
 - f. more relief expenditures per case (+).
2. Counties with better economies are likely to have:
 - a. more revenue (+)
 - b. less restrictive (more liberal) eligibility and grant requirements (-)
 - c. a smaller general relief caseload (-)
 - d. more relief expenditures per case (+).
3. Counties with more revenue are likely to have:
 - a. less restrictive (more liberal) eligibility and grant requirements (-)
 - b. a larger general relief caseload (+)
 - c. more relief expenditures per case (+).
4. Counties with more Democratic voting populations are likely to have:
 - a. less restrictive (more liberal) eligibility and grant requirements (-)
 - b. a larger general relief caseload (+)
 - c. more relief expenditures per case (+).
5. Counties with more restrictive eligibility and grant requirements are likely to have:
 - a. a smaller general relief caseload (-)
 - b. more relief expenditures per case (+).

Figure 1 about here

Figure 1

FLOW MODEL OF STRUCTURAL AND POLICY IMPACTS
ON CASELOAD AND EXPENDITURES



These factors will be further examined and refined in the next two sections. The changing impact of the structural variables over a nine year period (1974 - 1982) will be explored. Attempts will also be made to produce a causal model of the structural and policy factors which affect caseload and expenditure during the year 1982.

IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL AND POLITICAL VARIABLES¹²⁴

The ideal situation would be the development of causal models including both structural and policy factors (maximum grants, eligibility requirements, and work restrictions) for the entire period of the study. However, data on policy factors are available only for 1982. Even so, it is possible to get some idea of the changing influences of the structural factors over the research period. This across-years design should allow a stronger assessment of the independent variables than would be the case with a single-year cross-sectional study.

124. The data for the analysis below were derived from the following sources: Caseload and average grant - State of California, Health and Welfare Agency, Department of Social Services, Public Welfare in California PA 3, (1973 through 1982); Population - U.S. Census (1980), Population Estimates of California Cities and Counties, Department of Finance, Population Research Unit, (1974 through 1979 and 1981, 1982); Revenue - State of California, Controllers Office, Annual Report of Financial Transactions Concerning Counties of California, (1974 through 1981), information for 1982 was supplied by Mike Havey of the Controller's office, by telephone; Inflation rate - California Statistical Abstracts, Consumer Price Index (1974 through 1982); Vote and Voter Registration - State of California, Secretary of State, Statement of the Vote for General Elections and Voter Registration, (1972 through 1982); Unemployment Rate - State of California Employment Development Department, Employment Data and Research Department, (1974 through 1982).

Operationalization of the structural variables can be accomplished through indicators representing size, economic conditions, financial conditions, and political makeup of the county. Indicators of the dependent variables, caseload and expenditures per case, also can be developed.

The measure of size of counties used was population logged to the base ten to even out extreme cases.¹²⁵ Population was considered the best indicator because population represents the factors of population density, urbanization, degree of industrialization and the level of economic development. Virtually all previous research studies examining census data have shown that population is highly related to all these factors and these sets of variables usually occur together.¹²⁶ In other words, counties with large population tend to be highly urbanized, heavily industrialized, and maintain a high level of financial complexity.

The economic conditions are best measured using the unemployment rate by county by year. This variable was considered the best because it reflects most accurately the changes in the economic well-being of the county. But, it is also used because unemployment rate is one of the few

125. Population was logged to the base ten because Los Angeles County produced a skewed distribution. Use of the raw population data produced curvilinear relationships with the other variables. Logging a skewed variable brings extreme cases back in.

126. For example, see Hofferbert, "Socioeconomic Dimensions."

measures of economic conditions which is published by county as far back as 1974.¹²⁷ It should be noted, however, that the use of unemployment rates as an indicator reverses the predictions of the causal model since higher rates indicate worse conditions.

Financial conditions of the counties can be stated as the total revenue from all sources available to a county. This was used as the most direct indicator of the financial condition because this measure is sensitive to policy changes. Such changes as Proposition 13 in 1978 dramatically affected most counties' revenue. The overall financial health of a county is, therefore, directly related to revenue received. For this study revenue of the counties was divided by population to obtain revenue per capita. Revenue per capita for all years was expressed in 1967 dollars, based on the California Consumer Price Index. Unfortunately, the result was a skewed distribution dominated by a few outliers. Because of this, the log to the base ten was used to even the distribution of revenue over counties.¹²⁸ San Francisco County was only included in 1982. In earlier years the county did not report its revenue.

The most consistent measure of political makeup over the period of the study was partisanship. Partisanship was measured by the Democratic

127. For this study, Imperial County was excluded because of its abnormally high unemployment rate from 1974 to 1982. Extreme outliers produce biased regression results by skewing the slope coefficients. Loss of information is balanced by a more stable estimate for the other 57 counties.

128. See footnote 125 above.

voting deviation from the state mean. To minimize idiosyncratic variation from election to election, an average deviation was created from Democratic voter registration advantages and Democratic advantages in gubernatorial and Presidential elections.¹²⁹

Caseload can be defined as single individuals on general home relief within a county. In order to remove contamination from population, figures are expressed as cases per 10,000 population. Family cases on general relief were not considered, as family case data used for this study did not give indications of the number of people in each family. Again, because some counties (e.g. San Francisco) had abnormally high case loads, the log to the base ten was taken to even the distribution.

Expenditures per case were translated as the average grant per month per single individual. Family cases were excluded for the reasons given above.

The impact of the structural variables on logged caseload per 10,000 population and average grant per month for any year can be measured by a regression model:

$$\text{Logged Cases/10,000} = A + B_1 (\text{Logged Population}) + B_2 (\text{Logged Revenue per Capita}) + B_3 (\text{Democratic Deviation}) + B_4 (\text{Unemployment Rate}) + E$$

The least-squares estimates for the equations from 1974 to 1982 are reproduced in Table 1.

129. Example: 1974 Democratic Deviation = $\frac{1}{2}$ (County Democratic Vote % for Governor - State Democratic Vote % for Governor) + $\frac{1}{2}$ (County Democratic Voter Registration % - State Democratic Voter Registration %).

Table 1a and 1b about here

The R-squared represents the percent of variance in the dependent variables explained by all the independent variables used in each equation. The average R-square over the nine year period for logged cases per 10,000 is .48 and the comparable figure for average grants is .47. Essentially, this means that almost one-half of the variations of both dependent variables over the entire period was accounted for by logged population, logged revenue, democratic deviation and the unemployment rate.

The coefficient in a regression equation represents the effect that a one-unit change in the independent variable will have on the dependent variable while all other variables are held constant. For example, in 1974, a one-unit difference between counties in the logged population produces a .382 unit change in the log of general relief cases per 10,000. The comparable figure for a unit change in logged revenue is .444 units. For a one-unit change in the Democratic deviation, the effect is .018 units of change in logged cases. Finally, a one-unit change in the unemployment rate produces a .017 unit drop in the log of cases. The interpretation for other years is identical.

In similar fashion, for the average grant in 1974, a one-unit difference in the log of population across counties is associated with a \$10.65 higher average general relief grant. A one-unit change in the log of revenue produces a \$25.59 drop in the average grant. And, a variation of one percent in Democratic deviation is associated with a \$.35 fluctuation in the average amount received by a recipient. Lastly, a one-per-

TABLE 1
LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION ESTIMATES FOR LOGGED CASES AND AVERAGE GRANT
1a: LOGGED CASES

Year	R-Squared	Least Squares Equations
1974	.45	$\text{LGCASE74} = -1.983 + .382\text{LOGPOP74} + .444\text{LGREV74} + .018\text{DEMDEV72} - .017\text{UNEMP74}$ <p style="text-align: center;">(.097) (.445) (.009) (.019)</p>
1975	.45	$\text{LGCASE75} = -1.775 + .414\text{LOGPOP75} + .226\text{LGREV75} + .010\text{DEMDEV74} + .000\text{UNEMP75}$ <p style="text-align: center;">(.092) (.432) (.010) (.016)</p>
1976	.47	$\text{LGCASE76} = -1.479 + .395\text{LOGPOP76} + .147\text{LGREV76} + .005\text{DEMDEV74} - .004\text{UNEMP76}$ <p style="text-align: center;">(.084) (.453) (.009) (.020)</p>
1977	.55	$\text{LGCASE77} = -1.930 + .415\text{LOGPOP77} + .365\text{LGREV77} + .012\text{DEMDEV76} - .022\text{UNEMP77}$ <p style="text-align: center;">(.087) (.385) (.010) (.019)</p>
1978	.52	$\text{LGCASE78} = -2.456 + .387\text{LOGPOP78} + .751\text{LGREV78} + .015\text{DEMDEV76} - .054\text{UNEMP78}$ <p style="text-align: center;">(.085) (.377) (.011) (.020)</p>
1979	.56	$\text{LGCASE79} = -3.219 + .364\text{LOGPOP79} + 1.088\text{LGREV79} + .033\text{DEMDEV78} - .042\text{UNEMP79}$ <p style="text-align: center;">(.095) (.358) (.012) (.020)</p>
1980	.45	$\text{LGCASE80} = -2.441 + .349\text{LOGPOP80} + .735\text{LGREV80} + .029\text{DEMDEV78} - .026\text{UNEMP80}$ <p style="text-align: center;">(.113) (.428) (.013) (.018)</p>
1981	.43	$\text{LGCASE81} = -2.986 + .412\text{LOGPOP81} + .808\text{LGREV81} + .024\text{DEMDEV80} - .018\text{UNEMP81}$ <p style="text-align: center;">(.112) (.466) (.012) (.017)</p>
1982	.44	$\text{LGCASE82} = -1.828 + .324\text{LOGPOP82} + .507\text{LGREV82} + .027\text{DEMDEV80} - .015\text{UNEMP82}$ <p style="text-align: center;">(.100) (.323) (.011) (.014)</p>

Note: LGCASE equals logged cases per 10,000; LOGPOP equals logged population; LGREV equals logged revenue; DEMDEV equals Democratic deviation; UNEMP equals the unemployment rate.

TABLE 1 (Contd.)

1b: AVERAGE GRANT

Year	R-Squared	Least Squares Equations			
1974	.43	$\text{AVGPAY74} = 58.544 + 10.646\text{LOGPOP74} - 25.590\text{LGREV74} + .345\text{DEMDEV72} - 1.163\text{UNEMP74}$			
		(4.533)	(20.844)	(.441)	(.869)
1975	.49	$\text{AVGPAY75} = -16.123 + 16.618\text{LOGPOP75} - 11.863\text{LGREV75} + .291\text{DEMDEV74} - .199\text{UNEMP75}$			
		(3.920)	(18.405)	(.433)	(.689)
1976	.52	$\text{AVGPAY76} = -54.717 + 19.211\text{LOGPOP76} - 4.519\text{LGREV76} - .326\text{DEMDEV74} - .832\text{UNEMP76}$			
		(3.581)	(19.341)	(.423)	(.835)
1977	.51	$\text{AVGPAY77} = -43.494 + 16.841\text{LOGPOP77} + 1.124\text{LGREV77} - .332\text{DEMDEV76} - .316\text{UNEMP77}$			
		(3.813)	(16.860)	(.454)	(.851)
1978	.41	$\text{AVGPAY78} = -31.234 + 14.897\text{LOGPOP78} + 2.110\text{LGREV78} + .313\text{DEMDEV76} - .770\text{UNEMP78}$			
		(4.278)	(18.951)	(.531)	(1.008)
1979	.45	$\text{AVGPAY79} = -34.961 + 16.997\text{LOGPOP79} - 9.970\text{LGREV79} + .451\text{DEMDEV78} + 1.224\text{UNEMP79}$			
		(4.920)	(18.520)	(.598)	(1.028)
1980	.45	$\text{AVGPAY80} = - 8.830 + 14.067\text{LOGPOP80} - 11.690\text{LGREV80} + .869\text{DEMDEV78} + .387\text{UNEMP80}$			
		(5.328)	(20.123)	(.624)	(.862)
1981	.55	$\text{AVGPAY81} = -31.188 + 18.378\text{LOGPOP81} - 14.115\text{LGREV81} + .773\text{DEMDEV80} + .937\text{UNEMP81}$			
		(4.679)	(19.349)	(.479)	(.705)
1982	.44	$\text{AVGPAY82} = 9.533 + 12.909\text{LOGPOP82} - 10.896\text{LGREV82} + 1.529\text{DEMDEV80} - .292\text{UNEMP82}$			
		(5.121)	(16.480)	(.552)	(.669)

Note: AVGPAY equals the average grant, see note to Table 1a for other variable names.

centage point increment in the unemployment rate accounts for a \$1.16 fall-off of the average grant. All other years can be interpreted in similar fashion.

Unfortunately, while much information is available from Tables 1a and 1b, the tables do not allow assessment of the relative impact of each independent variable in comparison to the others. This is so because the unit of measurement is different for each independent variable. For instance, revenue and population variations are expressed in logarithms to the base ten, Democratic deviation is measured by percentage point deviations, and unemployment is measured in percentages. Moreover, the independent variables do not vary over the same ranges.

In order to assess the relative impact of the independent variables, it is necessary to express these variables in some standard unit. Fortunately, such a unit of measurement is available. This unit is the standard deviation. The standard deviation is a representation of the average deviation of each observation from the mean of all observations. This statistic makes variables comparable over all units of measurement. Thus, a standard deviation increase in logged population is proportionately equal to a standard deviation increment in Democratic deviation. The standard deviations for all of the independent variables for all years are given in Table 2.

Table 2 about here

Using the standard deviations in Table 2, it is possible to calculate the amount of change in both cases per 10,000 and average grants which will be produced by a standard deviation unit difference in each of the independent variables, controlling for the others. These results will be presented in Table 3.

Tables 3a and 3b about here

The units in Table 3a have been translated from logarithms back into real numbers to improve interpretability. These numbers represent orders of magnitude. For example, in 1974, a one standard deviation change in the log of population equals an approximate doubling in the number of cases per capita. By translating the standard deviation of the log of population into real numbers as well (a .777 standard deviation equals a 5.98 order of magnitude), the explanation is even more straightforward: as population sextuples across counties, relief cases per capita double. The explanation for Table 3b is less complex: all figures are expressed in dollars.

In Table 3a population dominates all other variables in explanatory power. The other independent variables do not have great impact until 1978 or 1979. Those years reflect the impact of Proposition 13 and the state bailout. Some counties received more revenue per capita than other counties from the state. The differences in revenue per county produced by these events decreased the influence of population. Overall, the effects are in the predicted direction, except for the unemployment vari-

TABLE 2
STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Year	Log 10 $\frac{1}{\text{Population}}$	Log 10 $\frac{1}{\text{Revenue}}$	Democratic Deviation	Unemployment Rate
1974	.777(5.98)	.152(1.42)	5.492	3.230
1975	.775(5.96)	.159(1.44)	5.118	3.355
1976	.774(5.94)	.136(1.37)	5.118	2.792
1977	.771(5.90)	.155(1.43)	4.477	2.923
1978	.766(5.83)	.163(1.46)	4.477	2.672
1979	.762(5.78)	.165(1.46)	4.459	2.747
1980	.762(5.78)	.167(1.47)	4.459	3.089
1981	.760(5.75)	.160(1.45)	4.918	3.612
1982	.759(5.74)	.188(1.54)	4.918	4.524

1/ The figures in parentheses are the anti-logs of the standard deviations. In substantive terms, they may be interpreted as orders of magnitude. In other words, in 1974 a .777 change in the log of population is equivalent to a 598 percent adjustment in population.

TABLE 3
 PREDICTED EFFECTS OF STANDARD DEVIATION CHANGES IN THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
 3a: CASES PER 10,000

Year	Logged Population Effect	Logged Revenue Effect	Democratic Deviation Effect	Unemployment Rate Effect
1974	1.98	1.17	1.26	(1.13)
1975	2.09	1.09	1.13	1.00
1976	2.02	1.05	1.06	(1.03)
1977	2.09	1.14	1.13	(1.16)
1978	1.98	1.33	1.17	(1.39)
1979	1.89	1.51	1.40	(1.30)
1980	1.84	1.33	1.35	(1.20)
1981	2.06	1.35	1.31	(1.04)
1982	1.76	1.25	1.36	(1.17)

Note: The figures in this table represent orders of magnitude. In other words, a one-standard deviation change in any of the listed variables will produce a change in the dependent variable of the listed magnitude. The figures in parentheses are reductions by an order of magnitude.

TABLE 3 (Cont.)
3b: AVERAGE GRANT

Year	Logged Population Effect	Logged Revenue Effect	Democratic Deviation Effect	Unemployment Rate Effect
1974	\$ 8.27	\$(3.89)	\$ 1.89	\$(3.76)
1975	12.88	(1.89)	(1.49)	.67
1976	14.87	(.61)	(1.67)	2.32
1977	12.98	.17	(1.49)	(.92)
1978	11.41	.34	3.66	2.06
1979	12.95	(1.65)	2.01	3.36
1980	10.72	(1.95)	3.87	1.20
1981	13.97	(2.26)	3.80	3.38
1982	9.80	(2.05)	7.52	(1.32)

Note: The figures in this table are in dollars and represent the predicted effects of a standard deviation change in any of the listed variables. Parentheses indicate a negative effect of standard deviation change in the listed variables.

able. Surprisingly, worse economic conditions apparently decrease the caseload rather than increase it.

Average grant (Table 3b) is also dominated by population. Other independent variables are subject to frequent changes in sign which accent the conclusions reached concerning population. Only after 1978 do the variables show any consistency, and then only Democratic deviation in 1982 displays any effect comparable to population.

Until 1978, size of the county dominates the explanation of differences across counties for both the number of cases and the amount of grant. With the impact of Proposition 13 other variables become more important. Proposition 13 clearly made counties more sensitive to fluctuations in scarce revenue, economic well-being or the lack thereof, and the political makeup of the county. But, this sensitivity appears to be more closely related to caseload rather than the size of the grant. Counties seem to reduce caseloads rather than cutting the size of the grants in response to severe revenue shortages. Cutting caseloads appears to respond more directly to political pressures on the welfare system.

Unfortunately, the structural factors do not present the impact of more immediate policy factors such as the restrictiveness of county welfare policy. Moreover, regression analysis does not really assess the interrelationship between the independent variables. In order to disentangle all of these effects, a more sensitive technique, path analysis, will be used in the next section.

THE CAUSAL MODEL OF STRUCTURAL, POLITICAL, AND POLICY FACTORS

In order to evaluate the causal model developed earlier in the chapter, it is necessary to expand on the analysis of the previous section and translate additional concepts and variables into indicators. To achieve this translation, three major revisions are necessary in the original hypotheses.

The first revision is the use of the unemployment rates to signify economic conditions. Higher unemployment rates actually indicate worse economic conditions. Therefore, there are changes in sign for those relationships involving economic conditions.

The second major change is the specification of the relationships among unemployment, Democratic deviation, and logged county revenue per capita which were not specified in the original model. For this model, the expectations are that higher unemployment rates will be associated with higher Democratic deviations because of the Democratic party's traditional concern for the jobless. The logged county revenue per capita is expected to have a negative association with Democratic deviation because richer counties are more likely to be conservative.¹³⁰

130. Dye, "Politics, Economics, and the Public," pp. 238-259; Dawson and Robinson, "The Politics of Welfare," and Tompkins, "A Causal Model."

Third, and last, the overall restrictiveness of the general relief policies should be measured. Maximum grant per person per county is the indicator that will be used. The other indicators such as property limitations and work restrictions showed little influence on either logged cases per 10,000 or average grant in preliminary studies. Earlier predictions suggested that the less restrictive the county the higher the caseload and the lower the average grant. However, because maximum grant is being used as a measure of restrictiveness the expectations are that higher maximum grants will lead to both higher caseloads and higher average grants.


The revised causal model is presented in Figure 2.

Figure 2 about here

The statistical technique most appropriate for separating the complicated relationships diagramed in Figure 2 is path analysis. Path analysis achieves this separation by expressing each indicator in the

Figure 2

PREDICTED RELATIONSHIPS AMONG CROSS-SECTIONAL INDICATORS



system as a linear combination of indicators preceding it in the causal model. Thus, each path analysis can be expressed as a series of structural equations. For example, in Figure 2 there would be five structural equations. The unemployment rate (Z_2) would be predicted by logged population (Z_1) plus an error term. Logged revenue per capita (Z_3) would be an expression of the combined effects of logged population and the unemployment rate. Democratic deviation (Z_4) would be a linear combination of logged population, unemployment rate and logged revenue per capita. Maximum grant (Z_5) will be predicted by logged population, the unemployment rate, logged revenue per capita, and Democratic deviation. Logged cases per 10,000 and average grant (Z_6) are formed by the combination of the other five variables.

The coefficients produced by these structural equations are path coefficients. These coefficients represent the direct effect of the predictor indicator on the dependent indicator. What gives path analysis its true interpretive power, however, is the ability it gives the researcher to combine these direct paths in order to assess the indirect effects of other variables on the relationship under examination. In other words, the influence of logged population on logged cases per 10,000

can be measured directly by examining the path coefficient for that relationship. In addition, it is possible to measure the indirect effect of population on caseload by tracing the paths through unemployment rate, logged county revenue, Democratic deviation, and maximum grant.


The complete path models for logged cases and average grants are presented in Figures 3 and 4. The path coefficients in these diagrams are standardized regression coefficients. That is to say, they are the regression coefficients obtained when all indicators are expressed in standard scores (the Z's in the structural equations in Figures 3 and 4).¹³¹ The indicators U,V,W,X, and Y are residual terms representing

Figures 3 and 4 about here

131. A standard score is a subject's score on an indicator expressed as a deviation from the mean of the indicator divided by the standard deviation of the indicator. Indicators expressed in a standard score form have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. This gives all indicators expressed in standard score form a common unit of measurement.

Figure 3

PATH COEFFICIENTS AMONG CROSS-SECTIONAL INDICATORS
FOR LOGGED CASES PER 10,000, 1982*



Structural Equations:


- (1) $Z_2 = -.563Z_1 + .826U$
- (2) $Z_3 = -.634Z_1 - .100Z_2 + .812V$
- (3) $Z_4 = .579Z_1 + .370Z_2 + .222Z_3 + .909W$
- (4) $Z_5 = .378Z_1 - .068Z_2 - .172Z_3 + .205Z_4 + .797X$
- (5) $Z_6 = .461Z_1 - .136Z_2 + .236Z_3 + .253Z_4 + .180Z_5 + .735Y$

* All figures are path (or standardized regression) coefficients.

** Paths have opposite signs from those predicted in Figure 2.

Figure 4

PATH COEFFICIENTS AMONG CROSS-SECTIONAL INDICATORS
FOR AVERAGE GRANT, 1982*



Structural Equations:

- (1) $Z_2 = -.563Z_1 + .826U$
- (2) $Z_3 = -.634Z_1 - .100Z_2 + .812V$
- (3) $Z_4 = .579Z_1 + .370Z_2 + .222Z_3 + .909W$
- (4) $Z_5 = .378Z_1 - .068Z_2 - .172Z_3 + .205Z_4 + .797X$
- (5) $Z_6 = .270Z_1 - .033Z_2 - .028Z_3 + .253Z_4 + .352Z_5 + .715Y$

* All figures are path (or standardized regression) coefficients.

** Paths have opposite signs from those predicted in Figure 2.

the impact of unmeasured variables which have not been included in the model.

Close examination of both figures reveals that the predicted signs of some of the paths are not correct. The most significant error is the path from population to revenue per capita.¹³² The prediction was that larger counties would have higher revenue per capita. In fact, larger counties have significantly lower revenue per capita. This suggests that revenue does not increase as rapidly as population, and that larger counties have much less flexibility in their revenue sources.

Similarly, it was hypothesized that higher unemployment rates would lead to a larger number of cases per 10,000.¹³³ The coefficients in Figures 3 and 4 suggest, on the other hand, that higher unemployment rates lead to lower cases. This implies that worsening economic conditions induce the counties to restrict their caseloads and the size of their grants rather than expand them in response to economic conditions. This conclusion is reinforced by the negative path from unemployment rate to maximum grant, i.e. higher unemployment rates lead to more restrictive policies.

132. See pages 42 and 58.

133. See pages 42 and 58 .

Several paths leading from revenue per capita were also incorrectly predicted.¹³⁴ Higher revenue per capita was thought to lead to lower pro-Democratic voting, but higher maximum grants. The opposite conclusions are supported. Counties with higher revenue per capita tend to have higher Democratic deviation from the mean, and lower maximum grants. Larger average grants were also expected to arise from higher revenue per capita when, in fact, there is virtually no effect.

In general, revenue per capita and unemployment rates produce opposite effects from those predicted by the model. Unfortunately, with many paths it is often difficult to assess the relative influence of several indicators. Path analysis does provide a mechanism for getting around the problems caused by the complexity. It is possible to analyze zero-order correlation coefficients and break them down into direct effects due to the independent predictor under consideration and indirect effects mediated through other indicators in the system.

For the models in Figures 3 and 4 the direct and indirect impact of size on both caseload and average grant can be examined using this method. More specifically, the correlation between logged population and logged cases per 10,000 ($r=.565$) and the correlation between logged

134. See pages 42 and 58.

population and average grant ($r=.566$) can be broken down into direct and indirect paths.¹³⁵ This is done in Table 4.

Table 4 about here

135. The complete expansion is given by the following equations:

$$r_{61} = P_{61} + P_{62}P_{21} + P_{63}P_{31} + P_{63}P_{32}P_{21} + P_{64}P_{41} + P_{64}P_{42}P_{21} + P_{64}P_{43}P_{31} + P_{64}P_{43}P_{32}P_{21} + P_{65}P_{51} + P_{65}P_{52}P_{21} + P_{65}P_{53}P_{31} + P_{65}P_{53}P_{32}P_{21} + P_{65}P_{54}P_{41} + P_{65}P_{54}P_{42}P_{21} + P_{65}P_{54}P_{43}P_{31} + P_{65}P_{54}P_{43}P_{32}P_{21}.$$

The term P_{61} represents the direct effect of population on either caseload or average grant. All terms beginning with P_{62} represent the indirect effects of size as channeled through county unemployment rates. The terms beginning with P_{63} compose the indirect effects of population as transmitted by revenue per capita. The indirect effects of population adjusted for the Democratic deviation of the county is the sum of all paths beginning with P_{64} . Finally, the terms containing P_{65} signify the indirect effects of population as transferred through maximum grant.

TABLE 4

DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF LOGGED COUNTY POPULATION
ON LOGGED CASES PER 10,000 AND AVERAGE GRANT

a. Logged Cases per 10,000

Direct effect:

Logged Population	.461
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Indirect effect through:

Unemployment Rate	.077	
Logged Revenue Per Capita	-.137	
Democratic Deviation	.060	
Maximum Grant	.101	

Total Indirect	<u>.101</u>
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Correlation Between Logged Population and Logged Cases	.565*
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b. Average General Relief Grant

Direct effect:

Logged Population	.270
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Indirect effect through:

Unemployment Rate	.019	
Logged Revenue Per Capita	.016	
Democratic Deviation	.060	
Maximum Grant	.199	

Total Indirect	<u>.294</u>
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Correlation Between Logged Population and Average Grant	.566*
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*Direct and Indirect effects do not sum because of rounding error.

Several conclusions can be drawn from the table. The direct impact of logged population is greater on logged cases per 10,000 than on average grant. Correspondingly, the indirect effects through the other indicators are much larger on average grant. However, this conclusion is a little deceptive. Closer examination of the indirect effects reveals a remarkable disparity between the two indicators.

Looking first at the impact of population on cases, it is clear that each of the other indicators has a substantial effect. Population as mediated through unemployment rate has a positive influence on the number of cases. Democratic deviation and maximum grant also increase the correlation between logged population and logged cases. On the other hand, the mediating effect of logged revenue serves to substantially reduce the correlation. As a result, the net indirect effect is much smaller than might be anticipated.

The indirect effects of size on average grant are very different. Unemployment and logged revenue per capita have virtually no mediating influence. The most powerful intermediary effects are those of maximum grant and Democratic deviation. In fact, virtually all of the indirect effects are accounted for by these two indicators.

Substantively, Table 4 suggests some interesting conclusions. First, the addition of maximum grant to the equations clearly increases the explanatory power of the models over those specified in the previous section. The mediating effects of maximum grant are strong for both dependent indicators. This implies that the addition of more immediate policy factors to a model including structural factors may well improve the accuracy of prediction.

Second, the structural factors do not have the same impact for logged cases and average grant. In the regression equations derived for the structural indicators in the previous section, the economic and financial factors had more influence on logged cases per 10,000 than on average grant. This conclusion is supported by the data in Table 4. The correlation between logged population and logged cases is distinctly more sensitive to variations in unemployment rate and logged revenue per capita than is the correlation between logged population and average grant.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has attempted to clarify the forces affecting county general relief policies in California. Because general relief programs are county-funded and county-administered, there is a wide variation in programs across counties.¹³⁶ Even so, the counties share certain structural constraints and policy restrictions. A county's relief policies will be affected by its population, its economic conditions, its financial solvency, and its political biases. The policies will also be affected by the number of restrictions placed on eligibility and the size of the grant.

When these relationships are tested empirically, certain patterns emerge. Differences in population clearly dominate differences in relief outputs. Within that context, caseloads appear to be more sensitive to

136. See Appendix B.

financial and economic differences among counties. Average grants, on the other hand, show little sensitivity to economic and financial factors. Both policy outcomes appear to be sensitive to political differences and differences in policy restrictiveness. This suggests an interesting conclusion. Counties seem to respond to difference in economic strength and financial well-being by manipulating the size of the caseload rather than the size of the grant. In other words, the most politically viable alternative for county administrators faced with poorer economies and revenue shortfalls is the reduction of the general relief rolls.

This conclusion, however, should be reached with some care. Much of this analysis has been based on cross-sectional data. It is risky to draw time-based conclusions from such a data set. To evaluate the impact of long-term fluctuations in structural and policy variables a time-series analysis is necessary. Such an analysis, aggregated to the state level, is presented in the next chapter.

Chapter 3

LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF GENERAL RELIEF

Introduction

This chapter focuses on structural, political, and policy factors which produce changes over time in aggregate county general relief policies (i.e. county general relief cases and county-funded payments combined across all 58 counties). However, because the focus of the study has shifted from explanation of difference across individual counties to explanations of state-level differences across years, the theoretical model must be respecified.

The next section describes the theoretical model in some detail. The structural, political and policy variables are redefined to take into account the fact that the data concern changes in aggregate county general relief policy at the state level, and not differences in policy across counties.

The indicators used to identify policy changes are total county general relief cases per 1,000 population for the period 1951 through 1982, general relief payments per capita expressed in 1967 dollars, and relief payments per case adjusted for inflation.¹³⁷ Data on these measures are presented in figures 5, 6, and 7. The factors hypothesized to produce

137. This data is drawn from the 1982 Public Welfare in California previously cited.

variations in these measures across time are economic (unemployment rate), political (Democratic or Republican control of the state government), and policy-oriented (major changes in state welfare policy or financial structure in 1957, 1965, 1971, and 1978).¹³⁸ Population and county revenue are not relevant since all data is aggregated by counties to the state level.

The statistical model used to analyze each of the three measures of relief policy change is time-series regression. The time-series regression model is simply multiple regression applied to cases which represent time periods. The section on the statistical model describes the model in more detail for all three of the measures of general relief. The findings are discussed in some detail. Then, the possibility that different policy changes cause welfare administrators to react differently to changes in unemployment rate and party control of the state government is considered. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the time-series analysis.

138. These policy changes are given in more detail in the next section.

THEORETICAL MODEL

The conceptual model presented in Chapter 2 provides a convenient starting point for analyzing cross-time changes. In general, aggregate relief policies would be expected to respond to such structural factors as the economic condition and political makeup of the state. By contrast, since changes across time are little influenced by factors which explain differences across counties, size and financial conditions will have little impact. Both variables, and their respective indicators, population and county revenue from all sources, are subject to incremental growth when examined over any period of time. This incremental growth, which is highly correlated with time, is difficult to interpret in a time-series context.

General relief policies should also be expected to respond to more direct policy factors. Such policy factors would include any major changes in the general welfare structure of the state. Policy changes by the state will profoundly affect eligibility requirements and maximum grants at the county level.

To develop these relationships and to lay the groundwork for the empirical analysis, the variables must be operationalized. For this study the impact of the independent variables will be examined on three different indicators of changes in relief policy. The first will be cases per 1,000 population. The adjustment for population is made to minimize the influence of population increases in California. Data for the period 1951 to 1982 are shown in Figure 5. The second indicator is general relief payments per capita expressed in 1967 dollars. The indicator re-

moves the effects of both inflation and population increases. Relief payments per capita for the period 1951 to 1982 are presented in Figure 6. The third, and perhaps most important, indicator is relief payments per case adjusted for inflation. This indicator should be sensitive to changes in welfare philosophy at the county level. This is to say, by comparing the impact of the independent variables on cases per 1,000 and relief payments per case, an assessment of the relative priorities of the county relief system ought to be possible. Relief payments per case are summarized in Figure 7.

Figures 5, 6, and 7 about here

If economic condition is measured using the yearly California unemployment rate over the period of the study, then the following relationships should hold. As unemployment increases (i.e. as the economy worsens), the number of cases per 1,000 should increase. Similarly, unemployment increases should lead to increases in both relief payments per capita and relief payments per case as demands on the relief system increase.

Democratic control of the state government will produce higher caseloads and higher relief payments (whether measured against population or cases). Mixed control should produce lower overall averages on all three indicators. Republican control would be expected to result in the lowest figures of the three types of control.

Figure 5

GENERAL RELIEF CASES PER 1,000 POPULATION, 1951 - 1982




Figure 6

GENERAL RELIEF PAYMENTS PER CAPITA IN 1967 DOLLARS, 1951 - 1982





Figure 7

GENERAL RELIEF PAYMENTS PER CASE IN 1967 DOLLARS, 1951 - 1982



Four major welfare policy changes in California are likely to show the greatest impact of all available policy factors. The first is the package of reforms passed by the 1957 legislature. These laws increased the number of welfare programs and expanded grant structures. Though not directly affected by the state laws, the counties liberalized general relief policies. Therefore, one would expect to find increases in county caseload and relief payments beginning in 1958.

The second major policy change was the passage by the federal government of the various War on Poverty programs. The adoption of these programs by California in 1965 changed the welfare structure in the state. Two changes in particular seem relevant to county relief policies. First, the wide variety of federal programs allowed the temporary transfer of many general relief recipients to state and federal programs. Second, and more importantly, the Great Society produced a more liberal welfare philosophy than in the past. Thus, it became much easier in the long run to receive welfare at all levels. In statistical terms, the adoption of these changes should be reflected in an immediate drop in general relief caseload followed by a rapid increase. Relief payments for those remaining on general relief should increase dramatically since relief funds would already be allocated.

The third policy alteration impacting on county general relief programs was the 1971 Welfare Reform Act. In response to rapidly expanding caseloads and expenditures at both the state and county levels, Governor Ronald Reagan proposed, and the California legislature approved, major changes in the state welfare laws. The primary focus of these reforms was the reduction of the caseloads of state-mandated programs.

The grants were to remain the same or increase. Because state programs are administered by the counties, these changes were carried over to county general relief programs as well. Therefore, an examination of general relief cases and relief payments after 1971 should show a dramatic drop in cases per 1,000 and either no drop or an increase in relief payments per case.

The final modification in state policy which had a significant effect on county relief policy was the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978. Since most counties rely heavily on the property tax for revenue, the passage of the proposition effectively reduced available funds for county programs. While the state provided temporary bailout money to most counties, the counties responded in the long run by drastically restricting their general relief programs. Thus, relief cases and relief payments after 1979 should show some decrease.

STATISTICAL MODEL

The statistical technique which will be used to assess the relationships discussed in the previous section is again multiple regression. Unlike the structural regressions presented in Chapter 2, the cases will represent the years 1951 through 1982. Thus, the analysis will be based on 32 cases. There is, however, an additional complication which arises from the use of multiple regression techniques on time-series data. This problem is autocorrelation. The regression model assumes that the forces influencing one observation are not the same forces influencing a subsequent observation (i.e. the error in predicting the first observation is not related to the error in predicting the second observation). Since

the cases in a time-series are time periods, forces affecting one time period are very likely to influence the subsequent time periods, thus violating the regression model. In order to deal with the possibility of autocorrelation an additional statistic, the Durbin-Watson statistic, which tests for autocorrelation, will be presented.

The indicators to be used in this analysis are presented below:

- Y_1 = General relief cases per 1,000 population.
- Y_2 = General relief payments per capita (real dollars).
- Y_3 = General relief payments per case (real dollars).
- X_1 = State Unemployment rate by year.
- D_1 = Democratic control of state government.
- D_2 = Mixed control of state government.
- E_1 = Passage of 1957 welfare reforms.
- E_2 = Adoption of 1965 Great Society programs.
- E_3 = Passage of 1971 welfare reforms.
- E_4 = Passage of Proposition 13 in 1978.

The Y indicators are the dependent variables in the regression analysis. X, D, and E, are the independent indicators. The unemployment rate (X_1) is a continuous indicator. By contrast, D and E are sets of dummy indicators. Each indicator is coded "1" for the presence of and "0" for the absence of the influence. Note that for both sets of indicators there is one less indicator than there are categories. In particular, there is no indicator for Republican control and no indicator for the period prior to the 1957 welfare reforms. This is necessary for the regression model to work. The presence of Republican control is indicated by the absence of both Democratic and mixed control. The same is true for the seven years prior to 1958. The inclusion of indicators for these categories would be statistically redundant.

The results of the regressions of the three indicators Y_1 , Y_2 , and Y_3 on the set of independent indicators are presented in the equations below:

$$Y_1' = 3.226 + .257X_1 - .930D_1 - .322D_2 + .705E_1 - 1.640E_2$$

$$(.086) \quad (.327) \quad (.355) \quad (.413) \quad (.390)$$

$$-2.202E_3 - 2.910E_4; R^2 = .889; d = 1.371.$$

$$(.538) \quad (.537)$$

$$Y_2' = 1.075 + .139X_1 - .358D_1 - .048D_2 - .143E_1 - .528E_2$$

$$(.040) \quad (.152) \quad (.165) \quad (.192) \quad (.181)$$

$$- .246E_3 - .810E_4; R^2 = .722; d = 1.251.$$

$$(.250) \quad (.250)$$

$$Y_3' = 363.470 + 5.342X_1 + 10.889D_1 + 5.821D_2 - 93.558E_1$$

$$(5.889) \quad (22.361) \quad (24.230) \quad (24.231)$$

$$+ 51.426E_2 + 296.714E_3 + 303.616E_4; R^2 = .972; d = 1.851$$

$$(26.640) \quad (36.772) \quad (36.698)$$

The Y' in each equation represents the predicted Y from the regression equation rather than the observed Y . The R^2 is the coefficient of determination and represents the percentage of the variation in each dependent indicator explained by all of the independent indicators. The d value is the Durbin-Watson statistic. In order to conclusively state that there is autocorrelation the d must be less than .98 for this number of independent indicators. In order to conclusively state that there is no autocorrelation the d must be larger than 2.01. Unfortunately, all three values fall in the inconclusive range. However, it can be shown algebraically that positive autocorrelation, (the most frequent kind) biases the standard errors (the figures in parenthesis) rather than the slope coefficients. This means that the standard errors will generally be too small and the researcher can over-estimate the significance of

the relationship. The slope coefficients, on the other hand, can be used as calculated, but with extreme care.

Recalling that the slope coefficients can be interpreted as the amount of change in the dependent indicator produced by a one-unit change in the independent indicator controlling for the other indicators in the equations, the equations can now be discussed. Looking first at the regression equation for cases per 1,000, a number of interesting facts are apparent. Controlling for the impact of the political and policy factors, the relationship between increases in unemployment rate and relief cases per 1,000 is positive as predicted. A one-percentage point increase in the rate of unemployment produces a .257 increase in the number of relief cases per 1,000 or about one-quarter of one case. Since unemployment ranged over a six-percentage point span, the number of relief cases per 1,000 varied by as much as one and one-half cases, almost one-third of the total range in the dependent indicator.

The impact of the political factors is much more surprising, however. Democratic control of the state government was expected to lead to increases in caseload. In fact, the opposite is apparently the case. The average number of relief cases per 1,000 during Democratic administrations is .930 cases lower than under Republican administrations, even adjusting for differences in unemployment and policy environment. Mixed control produces a higher average than Democratic control, but even this average is .322 cases below the Republican average.

The strongest influences appear to rise from the policy factors. In general, the coefficients adhere to expectations. Adjusting for the effects of unemployment and political administration, the 1957 welfare

reforms produce a .705 case increase over the average number of relief cases during the 1951 to 1957 period. The subsequent policy changes produce substantial drops in relief cases per 1,000 over the 1951 - 1957 period. Moreover, each policy change represents a substantial drop in caseload over the previous policy change. The War on Poverty changes reduce the average general relief caseload per 1,000 by over 2.3 cases (from .705 cases higher than 1951 - 1957 to 1.640 cases lower than 1951 - 1957). The 1971 welfare reforms dropped the caseload an additional .562 cases to 2.202 cases below the 1951 - 1957 average. Finally, Proposition 13 reduces caseload still further to 2.910 below the 1951 - 1957 average.

The impact of the economic, political, and policy factors on total relief payments per capita is very similar. The effect of unemployment rate is again positive, producing a \$.139 increase in total relief per capita for every one-percentage point increase in unemployment rate. The influence of Democratic control of state government is again negative, reducing average relief payments by \$.358 over Republican control. In terms of the policy factors, the highest average relief payments per capita occur in the 1951 - 1957 period prior to any major policy change. All subsequent policy changes produced lower average payments per capita. Only the coefficients for 1971 represent an increase over the previous time period, and, even then the figure is still below the 1951 - 1957 average.

Relief payments per capita can be viewed as total available relief revenue adjusted for population. In this sense, it represents a relatively fixed source of relief. On the other hand, relief payments per

case represent that total available relief divided among the eligible cases. Therefore, dramatically different effects of the independent indicators on relief per case are not surprising. The influence of unemployment rate is positive. It increases relief per case by \$5.342 for every one-percentage point increase in unemployment. However, since these payments vary from approximately \$296.00 per year to approximately \$764.00 per year, the effect of unemployment is not very significant. The political influences are equally weak. A Democratic administration and a Democratic legislature only increase relief per case by \$10.889 over a Republican controlled government. Mixed control only increases relief per case by \$5.821 over Republican control. The really powerful influences are those of the policy factors. Contrary to earlier expectations, the 1957 welfare reforms dramatically reduce relief payments per case (by \$93.558 over the 1951 - 1957 period). By contrast, the 1965 and 1971 policy changes increase relief per case as expected. Surprisingly, the average relief payment per case after Proposition 13 is slightly higher (by about \$7.00) than the same payment in the 1972 - 1978 period.

Before these results are summarized, however, a note of caution is in order. None of the regression equations account for possible interaction among the economic, political, and policy factors. That is, it is entirely possible that unemployment rate will affect each measure of general relief differently for each political change or each policy change. Normally, this possibility can be assessed by adding interaction terms representing all possible combinations of the indicators to each regression equation. But, because the R^2 in each equation is so high, the addition of interaction terms causes distorted results. Therefore, the

regression equations for the time periods between each policy change must be examined separately. The results for each dependent indicator are presented in Tables 5, 6, and 7. Because party control is different within each time period, the indicators used in each will vary.

Tables, 5, 6, and 7 about here

The segmented regression equations reveal patterns which are obscured in the more general equations. In particular, the influences of unemployment rate and party control on relief cases per 1,000 (Table 5) and relief payments per capita (Table 6) appear to be strongest in the periods following the adoption of the Great Society programs and the 1971 welfare reforms. In addition, unemployment rate, considered by itself, seems to put more upward pressure on relief caseload than on total relief payments. The impact of Democratic control remains negative regardless of time period.

Table 7 reveals even stronger differences. In the general equation describing relief payments per case, the coefficient for unemployment rate is positive. When this equation is broken down into time periods, the relationship is negative in all periods but the period from 1965 to 1971. That is to say, for most of the period from 1951 to 1982, increases in unemployment rate lead to reductions in relief payments per case. The impact of party control is basically insignificant except during the period 1972 to 1978 where the average payment increases by \$89.46 in the transition from Governor Ronald Reagan (R) to Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. (D).

Table 5

REGRESSION OF RELIEF CASES PER 1,000 ON UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
AND PARTY CONTROL, CONTROLLING FOR TIME PERIOD*

1951 - 1957

$$Y_1' = 1.499 + .674X_1; R^2 = .232$$

(.549)

1958 - 1964

$$Y_1' = 3.734 + .224X_1 - .471D_1; R^2 = .247$$

(.373) (.633)

1965 - 1971

$$Y_1' = .755 + .423X_1 - 1.181D_1 - .601D_2; R^2 = .933$$

(.103) (.333) (.296)

1972 - 1978

$$Y_1' = 1.144 + .198X_1 - .549D_1; R^2 = .703$$

(.086) (.181)

1979 - 1982

$$Y_1' = 1.432 - .015X_1; R^2 = .013$$

(.090)

*The period from 1951 - 1957 was a period of solely Republican control. The period from 1958 - 1964 was a period during which control shifted from Republicans to Democrats. The segment, 1965 - 1971, showed all three patterns of party control (including mixed). The time period, 1972 - 1978, was a period of mixed and Democratic control. Finally, the period 1979 - 1982 was dominated by Democrats.

Table 6

REGRESSION OF RELIEF PAYMENTS PER CAPITA ON UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
AND PARTY CONTROL, CONTROLLING FOR TIME PERIOD*

1951 - 1957

$$Y_2' = 1.101 + .132X_1; R^2 = .083$$

(.196)

1958 - 1964

$$Y_2' = 1.674 - .009X_1 - .195D_1; R^2 = .214$$

(.113) (.191)

1965 - 1971

$$Y_2' = -.221 + .278X_1 - .504D_1 - .165D_2; R^2 = .940$$

(.056) (.182) (.163)

1972 - 1978

$$Y_2' = 1.086 + .091X_1 - .181D_1; R^2 = .501$$

(.049) (.103)

1979 - 1982

$$Y_2' = 1.157 - .028X_1; R^2 = .103$$

(.058)

*The period from 1951 - 1957 was a period of solely Republican control. The period from 1958 - 1964 was a period during which control shifted from Republicans to Democrats. The segment, 1965 - 1971, showed all three patterns of party control (including mixed). The time period, 1972 - 1978, was a period of mixed and Democratic control. Finally, the period 1979 - 1982 was dominated by Democrats.

Table 7

REGRESSION OF RELIEF PAYMENTS PER CASE ON UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
AND PARTY CONTROL, CONTROLLING FOR TIME PERIOD*

1951 - 1957

$$Y_3' = 505.113 - 28.848X_1; R^2 = .591$$

(10.727)

1958 - 1964

$$Y_3' = 416.521 - 16.333X_1 - 9.511D_1; R^2 = .629$$

(6.375) (10.667)

1965 - 1971

$$Y_3' = 313.534 + 20.929X_1 - 8.758D_1 + 30.978D_2; R^2 = .796$$

(9.195) (29.816) (26.502)

1972 - 1978

$$Y_3' = 845.552 - 22.978X_1 + 89.464D_1; R^2 = .940$$

(5.436) (11.398)

1979 - 1982

$$Y_3' = 815.806 - 12.974X_1; R^2 = .685$$

(6.217)

*The period from 1951 - 1957 was a period of solely Republican control. The period from 1958 - 1964 was a period during which control shifted from Republicans to Democrats. The segment, 1965 - 1971, showed all three patterns of party control (including mixed). The time period, 1972 - 1978, was a period of mixed and Democratic control. Finally, the period 1979 - 1982 was dominated by Democrats.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The statistical models discussed in the previous section reveal several things about how counties in the aggregate respond to state-level changes in economic condition, political makeup, and policy environment. First, the regression equations suggest that, overall, California counties tend to view relief policy as a zero-sum game. Total relief revenue combined across counties appears to be relatively insensitive to all but major policy changes. Caseload, on the other hand, responds not only to policy factors but to economic and political factors as well. In combination, these influences produce the following results: if changes in the unemployment rate or control of state government force the relief caseload to rise, the average amount of money that the county gives to each recipient drops. Conversely, if political and economic changes force the caseload downward, relief payments per case rise. In general, this oscillating effect implies two things. It suggests that counties view total general relief as a fixed entity. It also indicates that counties tend to react to external factors such as changes in unemployment rate, political control, and state welfare law rather than act independently.

The only exception to this pattern is the period from 1965 to 1971. The adoption of the War on Poverty program, while it temporarily reduced relief caseloads, unleashed expansionary pressures in the relief system. Only during this period did caseload, total relief payments, and relief per case increase simultaneously. This signifies a major, albeit temporary, change in welfare philosophy. The coincident increase of all relief measures indicates that the fixed approach to relief policy was

briefly abandoned. However, the consequent rise in both state and county welfare expenditures produced a rapid political backlash. The 1971 Welfare Reform Act was the result.

The final point which can be derived from the equations is the overwhelming influence of state-level policy changes on county-level decisions. When the policy changes are controlled for by dividing the regressions into time periods, the remaining indicators rarely account for as much of the variance as the general equations do. Clearly, county welfare administrators and county boards of supervisors are highly sensitive to policy changes at the state level. Even when the changes have bearing only on state programs administered by the county, counties generally bring their own programs into conformity with state programs. This produces an interesting paradox. While county general relief programs vary widely in their eligibility, economic and work requirements, the net result of changes in those policies over time appears to bring them more into conformity with external state conditions. In other words, they maintain their uniqueness with regard to other counties but react quickly to changes in overall state-wide conditions.

Chapter 4

CONCLUSION: RETURN TO THE POOR LAW

Counties have accepted the responsibility for caring for the destitute. However, their programs vary widely. While some counties feel that their responsibility ends with minimal help to the recipient, others open their treasuries enough to feed and house the poor. Yet, even the most liberal counties (San Francisco and Santa Barbara) provide aid which leaves recipients below the poverty level. Moreover, all counties are basically restrictive.

Counties still place the poor in categories. There are "deserving" and "non-deserving" poor. By most standards, only the "able-bodied" are eligible for relief. Transients, hobos, alcoholics, and, as a Sacramento judge put it, the "unwashed" are unworthy of aid.¹³⁹ Those without street addresses are unable to receive help in most counties. A welfare official who shall remain anonymous, stated to this author that no one slept in the streets in her county despite abundant evidence to the contrary. Categorization has been perpetuated and becomes more apparent in times of high unemployment.

Furthermore, county residency requirements are perpetuated. For most counties these requirements are limited to proof of intent to remain in the county. However, some counties have stricter residency require-

139. "The State," Los Angeles Times 102 (April 4, 1983), Part 1, p. 2.

ments. The Poor Laws stated that the vagrant, or the stranger who was a potential vagrant, should be put out of the town without being helped. This type of thinking continues unchanged in some of the county general relief policies even if the cities in California are not walled. If one must have a residence in order to get aid but have no funds to rent a room, then the needy person is caught in an endless, downward spiral.

Because county resources are scarce it is also possible that counties will again try to find relatives who are able to support their poorer relations and reimburse the counties for aid expenditures. The Governor of California is already suggesting this approach for state medical aid reimbursement.

Virtually all counties impose work requirements of some kind. Some counties require recipients to work directly for their aid. Other jurisdictions expect grantees to register with the California State Employment Development Department and conduct an active job search. Still other counties do not have their own work programs, but coordinate work programs with other institutions. Regardless of the type of program, however, it is clear that most counties believe the aid must be earned.

The most extreme return to restrictive principles is the re-establishment of the poorhouse in Sacramento County. During the inception of the Poor Laws and even into the 18th century in the United States, poorhouses were used to help the poor correct problems which were considered of their own making. This new poorhouse seems to return to the thinking that the poor are responsible for their own problems. On the 15th of April, 1983, the first in what promises to be a long series of legal decisions on the Sacramento County poorhouse will be handed down.

This is the day that the judge of the Superior Court of the State of California is to rule on the constitutionality of the poorhouse. If the poorhouse is deemed legal, it is possible that other counties will institute poorhouses to contain the very poorest of the able-bodied.

Actually, county general relief policy has changed little since the 1850's. With statehood and the settling of California by the white Europeans, the modified poor laws were instituted. The argument that the philosophies of that time continue today is supported by history. Furthermore, this study of general relief provides evidence of the use of the Poor Law philosophy on current-day county general relief programs.

In general, relief policy is restrictive. It is designed intentionally to exclude certain classifications of individuals. However, the counties also appear to respond to changes in economic, financial, and political context. When resources appear scarce, the programs for the poor are restricted. When these resources are perceived to be plentiful, the programs are liberalized.

The cross-sectional study completed in Chapter 2 suggests that there are differences in the way in which county general relief programs across the 58 counties respond to external changes. For example, these programs are sensitive to the size of the county. The larger the county the less restrictive its program will be. The smaller the county, the more restrictive the general relief program. That is to say, the maximum grant in larger counties would be more than the maximum grant available in counties with a smaller population.

Economic and financial restrictions tend to affect the size of the caseload rather than the amount of the grant. As these conditions tend

to be cyclical in nature, caseload is allowed to grow during the 'good' times and is contracted during the 'bad' times. Although this is understandable from a county government point of view, it seems that more people need general relief and are unable to qualify for it during the 'bad' times.

Counties that are less restrictive in their policy requirements (such as those for eligibility) have larger caseloads and higher grants than other counties. These are also the counties with a greater population. The large counties, by virtue of their size, have a greater demand placed on them for help by those needing general relief.

The evidence presented in the longitudinal study (Chapter 3) suggests that general relief is a zero-sum game. Major policy changes that increase the size of grants reduce caseload or vice versa. Only during the Great Society era (programs accepted by California in 1965) did both the caseload and grants increase for a short time. There was a feeling throughout the nation during this time that there was plenty for everybody and that resources were unlimited. By 1971, California state realized that its welfare programs cost more than available funds allowed for. The backlash produced restrictions which were placed on recipients of welfare. This reduced the caseloads. However, grants remained large and, in some instances, actually increased.

In summary, both studies suggest that counties in California respond to policy changes at the state level. Economic conditions do not trickle down but are rather abruptly perceived in county general relief programs. At the same time, rises in the unemployment rate makes counties more aware of their available revenue. They realize that the rise

in unemployment rates means fewer dollars in the county treasury. Therefore, the county will restrict general relief programs and will make a greater distinction between the "deserving" and the "non-deserving" poor. This alone will restrict county caseload.

As long as restrictive philosophy is the dominant thinking in the counties, categorization, residency requirements, poorhouse use, and possible relative responsibility will remain in force. In the author's opinion, the use of this philosophy does not aid the poor in becoming upstanding citizens in their communities but will tend to push people down into poverty. Although such revolutionary thinking probably will not replace current welfare law, it would seem that all of the so-called poor deserve real help, even the homeless.

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"Ways to Get Welfare In Hand: Success For Two Big States." U.S. News and World Report 75 (December 24, 1974): pp. 66-69.

A comparative study of 1974 welfare policy in California and New York states.

Weller, Don. "Deukmejian To Seek Big Welfare Change." The Press Enterprise 105 (February 26, 1983): pp. 1, 7.

A speech by Governor Deukmejian to the Institute for Contemporary Studies in San Francisco on February 25.

"Whither Human Services?" Western City (March, 1979): pp. 4, 17, 18.

An article describing how to coordinate human services after California's Proposition 13.

Wood, Sammuel, F., "Work Camps Or Nothing," Survey 75 (April, 1939):
pp. 99-101.

An article about the handling of transients during the
Great Depression in California.

APPENDIX A

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The telephone survey of all 58 counties in California was conducted during December 1982 and January 1983. Welfare departments were contacted and the following questions were asked concerning their general relief programs. The length of the average interview was seven minutes.

1. Considering a one person household, what is the maximum grant available?
2. Are grants paid by check, cash or voucher system?
3. What are your residency requirements?
4. Does your county have a work program for the able-bodied? Please explain - for instance, is a job search conducted and are grants to be worked off before they are given to a recipient?
5. What are the upper limits on liquid assets, personal property, real property and automobiles that can be retained by an applicant for general relief and still qualify for aid?
6. Do you consider general relief to be an outright gift or a loan in your county? Do you take a lien on real property?

It should be noted that telephone surveys were conducted in 56 of the counties. Only Nevada and Trinity counties required letters which they subsequently answered.¹

1. See Appendix C for a further discussion of Trinity county.

APPENDIX B

THE RESULTS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The results of the telephone survey were varied and interesting.
The various headings I have used need some further clarification.

One Person - Maximum grant available for one able-bodied person living alone. Grant amounts are for one month periods.

Personal Property - In some counties personal property and liquid assets were defined as the same thing.

Other differences across counties are explained in the notes at the end of this appendix.

It should be noted that most counties had some type of transient program which I have not attempted to explain.

GENERAL RELIEF TELEPHONE QUESTIONNAIRE OF ALL COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS IN CALIFORNIA

COUNTY	ONE PERSON	TYPE	PAID BY	RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT	WORK PROG.	LIMITS OF QUALIFICATION			HOME	LIEN ON HOME
						CASH	PERS. PROP.	AUTO		
Alameda	\$200.00	Grant	Cash	Intent to Stay	yes		\$ 50.	\$1,500.	Exempt	<u>1./</u>
Alpine	AS NEEDED				no					no
Amador	73.50	Grant	Voucher	Intent	no		NO DEFINED LIMITS			no
Butte	160.00	Loan	Cash	Intent	<u>2./</u> yes		600.	1,500.	\$1,500.	no
Calaveras	40.00+ Util.	Grant	Cash	<u>3./</u>	no		500.	700.	2,000.	no
Colusa	AS NEEDED (Pay rent and utilities and food)				no		NO DEFINED LIMITS			no
Contra Costa	160.00	Loan	Voucher	Intent	yes		-0-	<u>4./</u> 1,500.	Exempt	
Del Norte	186.00	Loan	Voucher	Intent	yes	\$ 50.		1,500.	Exempt	yes
Eldorado	91.00	Loan	Voucher	Intent	<u>5./</u> yes	-0-	500.	2,000.	Exempt	yes

GENERAL RELIEF TELEPHONE QUESTIONNAIRE OF ALL COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS IN CALIFORNIA

COUNTY	ONE PERSON	TYPE	PAID BY	RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT	WORK PROG.	LIMITS OF QUALIFICATION			HOME	LIEN ON HOME
						CASH	PERS. PROP.	AUTO		
Fresno	\$248.00	Loan	Voucher	Intent	yes		\$1,000.		Exempt	yes
Glenn	SINGLE PERSON INELIGIBLE									
Humboldt	199.00	Loan	Cash & Voucher	Intent	<u>6./</u>	\$ 50.	50.	1,500.	Exempt	yes
Imperial <u>7./</u>	248.00	Loan	Cash & Voucher	Intent			100.	300.	Exempt	
Inyo <u>8./</u>	AS NEEDED			Intent		-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	
Kern	201.00	Loan	Cash	Intent	yes	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	
Kings	125.00	Loan	Voucher	Intent	yes		1,000.	-0-	Exempt	yes
Lake <u>9./</u>	248.00	Loan	Voucher	Intent	yes	50.	500.	500.	Exempt	yes
Lassen	216.00	Loan	Cash	Intent	<u>10./</u> yes		600.	1,500.	Exempt	yes

GENERAL RELIEF TELEPHONE QUESTIONNAIRE OF ALL COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS IN CALIFORNIA

COUNTY	ONE PERSON	TYPE	PAID BY	RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT	WORK PROG.	LIMITS OF QUALIFICATION				LIEN ON HOME
						CASH	PERS. PROP.	AUTO	HOME	
Los Angeles	228.00	Loan	Cash & Voucher	Intent	yes	50.	500.	1,500.	34,000. Mkt.Value	yes
Madera	<u>11./</u> 163.00	Loan	Cash	<u>11./</u>	reg. EDD		500.	750.	20,000. Mkt.Value	yes
Marin	186.00	Loan	Cash	Intent	reg. EDD		600.	Exempt	14,000.	yes
Mariposa	151.75	Loan	Cash	<u>12./</u> 1-year	yes		600.	1,500.	Assessed 3,500.	yes
Mendocino	248.00	Loan	Cash	Intent	<u>13./</u> yes		500.	1,500.	Exempt	yes
Merced	198.00	Loan	Cash	Intent	yes	1,500.	<u>14./</u>		Exempt	yes
Modoc	150.00	Grant	Cash & Voucher	Intent	no		600.	1,500.	Exempt	no
Mono	140.00	Grant	Cash & Voucher	<u>15./</u> 1-year	CETA only		150.	-0-	-0-	no
Monterey	248.00	Loan	Cash & Voucher	Intent	<u>16./</u> yes		500.	16.	Exempt	no

GENERAL RELIEF TELEPHONE QUESTIONNAIRE OF ALL COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS IN CALIFORNIA

COUNTY	ONE PERSON	TYPE	PAID BY	RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT	WORK PROG.	LIMITS OF QUALIFICATION				LIEN ON HOME
						CASH	PERS. PROP.	AUTO	HOME	
Napa	248.00	Grant	Cash	Intent	<u>17./</u> yes	50.	500.	1,500.	<u>17./</u> 5,000.	no
Nevada	225.00	Loan	Voucher	Intent	<u>18./</u> yes	50.	500.	1,000.	<u>18./</u> 14,000.	yes
Orange	240.00	Loan	Cash	Intent	yes	50.	1,000.	----	<u>19./</u> 5,000.	---
Placer	192.00	Loan	Cash	Intent	yes	50.		1,500.	Exempt	not neces.
Plumas	217.00	Loan	Cash & Voucher	Intent	yes		500.	600.	Exempt	yes
Riverside	191.00	Loan	Voucher	Intent	yes		250.	-0-	-0-	----
Sacramento <u>20./</u>	199.00	Loan	Cash	Intent	yes		10.	1,500.	20,000.	yes
San Benito	175.00	Loan	Voucher	Intent	yes		50.	1,000.	<u>21./</u> 10,000.	yes
San Bernardino	98.70	Grant	Voucher	Intent	no		10.	250.	<u>22./</u> 5,000.	no

GENERAL RELIEF TELEPHONE QUESTIONNAIRE OF ALL COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS IN CALIFORNIA

COUNTY	ONE PERSON	TYPE	PAID BY	RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT	WORK PROG.	LIMITS OF QUALIFICATION				LIEN ON HOME
						CASH	PERS. PROP.	AUTO	HOME	
San Diego	120.00	Loan	Cash	Intent	yes		50.	500.	Exempt	yes
San Francisco	248.00	Grant	Cash & Voucher	Intent	<u>23./</u> yes	25.	Exempt	Exempt	Exempt	no
San Joaquin	142.00	Grant	Voucher	Intent	yes		600.	1,500.	Exempt	yes
San Luis <u>24./</u> Obispo	202.00	Grant	Cash & Voucher	Intent	no	10.	AFDC STANDARDS		Exempt	no
San Mateo	248.00	Loan	Cash	Intent	yes		50.	500.	<u>25./</u> 2,500.	yes
Santa Barbara	<u>26./</u> 295.00	Grant	Cash & Voucher	Intent	yes		50.	800.	Exempt	no
Santa Clara	215.00	<u>27./</u> Grant	Cash	Intent	yes		150.	<u>27./</u> 1,000.	Exempt	yes
Santa Cruz	248.00	Loan	Voucher	Intent	yes		200.	<u>28./</u> 1,500.	25,000.	yes
Shasta	201.00	Loan	Cash	Intent	yes	50.	200.	1,500.	Exempt	yes

GENERAL RELIEF TELEPHONE QUESTIONNAIRE OF ALL COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS IN CALIFORNIA

COUNTY	ONE PERSON	TYPE	PAID BY	RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT	WORK PROG.	LIMITS OF QUALIFICATION				LIEN ON HOME
						CASH	PERS. PROP.	AUTO	HOME	
Sierra	AS NEEDED		Cash	Intent	no		1,000.	600.	1,000.	no
Siskiyou	208.00	Loan	Cash	Intent	<u>29./</u>		600.	1,000.	Exempt	yes
Solano	248.00	Loan	Cash	Intent	yes	25.	100.	750.	<u>30./</u> 5,000.	yes
Sonoma	<u>31./</u> 227.50	Loan	Cash	Intent	yes		-0-	1,500.	Exempt	yes
Stanislaus	240.00	Loan	Cash	Intent	yes		300.	1,000.	20,000.	yes
Sutter	150.00	Loan	Cash	Intent	yes		300.	1,000.	<u>32./</u> 1,000	yes
Tehama	<u>33./</u> 110.00	Grant	Cash & Voucher	1-year <u>33./</u>	no		600.	600.	Exempt	no
Trinity	AS NEEDED		Cash	1-year	no	50.	200.	500.	2,000.	no
Tulare	215.00	Loan	Cash	Intent	<u>34./</u> yes		<u>34./</u>	1,500.	Exempt	yes

GENERAL RELIEF TELEPHONE QUESTIONNAIRE OF ALL COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS IN CALIFORNIA

COUNTY	ONE PERSON	TYPE	PAID BY	RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT	WORK PROG.	LIMITS OF QUALIFICATION				LIEN ON HOME
						CASH	PERS. PROP.	AUTO	HOME	
Tuolumme	187.00	Loan	Cash & Voucher	1-year	yes		250.	1,500.	Exempt	yes
Ventura	201.00	Loan	Voucher	Intent	yes	100.	1,000.	<u>35./</u>	Exempt	yes
Yolo	174.00	Loan	Cash	Intent	yes		300.	1,500.	<u>36./</u> <u>5,000.</u>	no
Yuba	154.00	Loan	Cash & Voucher	Intent	<u>37./</u> yes		50.	300.	<u>37./</u> <u>5,000.</u>	yes

COUNTY NOTES

- 1./ Alameda - Plan to use lien on real property in near future.
- 2./ Butte - Recipients work 20 hours per week before receipt of grant.
- 3./ Calaveras - Relative responsible for repayment of grant.
- 4./ Contra Costa - Auto and personal property combined in total.
Work program requires two days work per week.
- 5./ ElDorado - Recipient sent to county work program after two months on general relief.
- 6./ Humboldt - Work off grant before it is given.
- 7./ Imperial - County has been subject of class-action suit in the recent past and has subsequently upgraded their program. Currently, changes in AFDC will cause changes in the general relief program.
- 8./ Inyo - Program is for residents only.
- 9./ Lake - This is a new program as of August 1982.
- 10./ Lassen - Grant only given after it is worked off.
- 11./ Madera - There is no limit on the amount of utilities that will be paid, there is no residency requirement.
- 12./ Mariposa - The county requires a one year residence in the county before applicant is eligible for the general relief program.
- 13./ Mendocino - Job search required of 6 places per week.
- 14./ Merced - Personal property limit includes the auto limit.
- 15./ Mono - The county requires a one year residence in the county before applicant is eligible for general relief.
- 16./ Monterey - Grant is to be worked off before it is given.
Auto limit is included in the personal property limit.
- 17./ Napa - Job program is not run by the county, recipient may have \$5,000. equity in a home.

- 18./ Nevada - Grant is given after it is worked off, home value is the assessed value of the home.
- 19./ Orange - Home limit is at assessed valuation.
- 20./ Sacramento - Even though these are the maximum limits for general relief, the Bannon Street house run by the Volunteers of America is the only program of general relief currently in use for the single adult or childless couples.
- 21./ San Benito - The county has a maximum grant of \$175. for rent, \$62. for food, \$6. for incidentals plus utilities will be paid. Applicant must work off rent costs before they are paid. Home limit is at assessed valuation.
- 22./ San Bernardino - Home is at assessed value.
- 23./ San Francisco - Work program is in connection with Glide Foundation. Some social workers are stationed at the Glide Foundation.
- 24./ San Luis Obispo - I was told by Mr. Moore, of this county, that the general relief program was a "very complicated process."
- 25./ San Mateo - Home valuation based on market value less encumbrances.
- 26./ Santa Barbara - This county will give aid to those who are verifiably living in their cars because Santa Barbara has a very high occupancy rate. Maximum grant consists of \$195. for rent, \$7. for miscellaneous, \$93. for groceries, or \$155. for restaurant food. There is a downtown hotel available for some recipients.
- 27./ Santa Clara - Work off before grant is given, car must be 5 years old or older.
- 28./ Santa Cruz - Auto limit is \$500. above encumbrances.
- 29./ Siskiyou - Must register with EDD and do job search.
- 30./ Soloano - Home limit is at net value.
- 31./ Sonoma - Emergency aid can be given for up to three days.

- 32./ Sutter - Home limit is the equity in a home a recipient may have.
- 33./ Tehama - Grant given plus utilities. Eligibility limited to those who have one year residency in county and 3 years in the state.
- 34./ Tulare - County work program pays \$2.68 per hour. Personal property limit is based on need.
- 35./ Ventura - Auto limit is included in the personal property limit.
- 36./ Yolo - Home limit is at net market value.
- 37./ Yuba - In order to conduct a job search, a recipient must contact 6 employers per week at the rate of 1 contact per day. Home limit is shown as \$5,000 equity.